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INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that health law is important, but no one agrees on what it is. Any subset of
law that channels two trillion dollars a year 1 merits serious attention, but scholars differ as to
∗

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. © 2008, Nan D. Hunter. I deeply appreciate the comments
of my Georgetown colleagues at a faculty workshop presentation, as well as feedback from members of the
Insurance Law and Society Seminar at Harvard Business School and participants in a panel on new governance in
health care at the 2007 Law and Society Conference. Special thanks to Stelios Xenakis for research assistance and to
Chai Feldblum for more than I can say.
1
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, total health care expenditures for 2007 are projected to reach $2.3 trillion. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2006–
2016 tbl.1, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2006.pdf (last visited May 24,
2008).
Page 1 of 50

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1213090

whether health law is an intellectually coherent field or a variation on “the law of the horse.” 2
These scholars wrestle with a maze of doctrinal paths in health law that pass through torts,
contracts, antitrust, bioethics, constitutional law and administrative law (among others), but seem
to have no conceptual center.
I argue in this Article that the best approach to understanding health law lies in focusing on
the practices of governance in health care, rather than on the various legal doctrines implicated in
health care delivery. Specifically, I argue that understanding the law that structures and regulates
American health care today as a system of governance organized around principles of risk
management and distribution can provide us with a new and better paradigm for health law.
What we have today is not your grandmother’s health care system. The last thirty years have
brought us three major changes: a widespread transformation from fee-for-service doctor-patient
encounters to a system of managed care; a shifting of financial risk for health care expenditures
away from insurers and onto providers and patients; and the construction of what amounts to
employer corporate sovereignty in the formulation and administration of risk pools for group
health insurance in the workplace.
These three phenomena have had dramatic effects on the underlying functions of health law.
Risk allocation and insurance principles now dominate the structure of health care access and
delivery. The discourse of risk and insurance has migrated from traditional finance questions into
what has long been thought of as the heart of health care and health law: the doctor-patient
relationship. As a result, I argue, the primary function of health law has become to manage,
articulate and institutionalize a system of governance based on the principle of protection against
financial, as well as clinical, risk.
Consider a simple example of the hegemony of risk-related discourse. Although there is
constant talk about “universal access to health care,” the policy issues that comprise that debate
actually concern universal access to health insurance. We all assume that the latter serves as a
proxy for the former. And yet, without any explicit acknowledgment on our part, we allow the
phrase’s shift in meaning to import to our understanding of “care” all of the questions and tradeoffs that inevitably arise from the pooling and pricing of risk that are intrinsic to insurance.
For purposes of this Article, I take the care/insurance transposition at face value, as correctly
reflective of our country’s system of health care today. I then use it as a springboard to raise
broader theoretical and normative questions. This Article thus has three goals: to develop risk
governance as a new theoretical paradigm for understanding the health care system and thereby
for understanding health law as a field; to demonstrate how risk governance has encouraged the
rise of corporate sovereignty through health insurance law; and finally, to propose new
experimentalist structures within a risk-governance model that can be used to democratize our
current health care system.

2

Sooner or later in any discussion of the intellectual viability of health law as a field, someone trots out the analogy
of “the law of the horse.” See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 391, 404 (2006) (“If a specter is in fact haunting health law, that specter appears to be ‘The Law of the
Horse.’”). The reference is to an essay by Judge Frank Easterbrook using the phrase to describe cyberlaw. See Frank
H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207. Easterbrook argued that
cyberlaw was simply another industry-specific category, not a coherent doctrinal field. Id. As with horses, one could
collect and analyze cases dealing with transactions that happened to concern the industry—sales of its products or
services, licensing, liability for accidents involving it, etc.—and call that a field, but he argued that law professors
instead should “study general rules” such as torts or contracts, and apply them to cyberspace, or horses (or the health
care system). Id. at 208.
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The organization of the Article tracks those goals. Part I develops the claim that the last
twenty years has produced a health care system centered on the measurement and allocation of
risk, or what I call “risk governance.” I describe the material bases that resulted in what I term
“actuarial medicine,” explicate the new knowledges that support such medicine, and identify the
normative tensions inherent in that system.
In Part II, I argue that understanding risk governance as the driving force in health care
today provides us with the most coherent paradigm for understanding health care law as a field. I
use the example of judicial interpretation of fiduciary duty—an issue that bridges doctrines of
contract, tort and insurance law—to show how conceptualizing health law as a mechanism of
risk governance offers a more holistic and integrated conceptualization of health law than the
other models offered to date.
Part III deconstructs and re-interprets the main body of law that allocates financial risk in
private health insurance: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). I argue that
the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of ERISA preemption has delegated risk pooling
functions to employers in a manner that creates a realm of corporate sovereignty in health law.
Courts interpreting ERISA have granted quasi-jurisdictional status to employer risk pools.
Contrary to most scholars, I argue that the proper way to remedy the inequities produced by
current law is not by curbing ERISA preemption and expanding state tort liability, but rather by
constructing creative and workable mechanisms to remedy the democracy deficit in the corporate
sovereignty of employer risk pools.
Part IV embarks on that endeavor. Most political sociologists assume that framing health
issues around the concept of risk will invariably produce more conservative, neoliberal political
outcomes. By contrast, I argue that the political valence of “risk” is subject to multiple
appropriations, including ones that could generate ongoing pressures to move in a more
egalitarian direction. I outline the advantages of building on workplaces to create politically
infused risk pools, drawing on new governance literature in the employment field to suggest
incremental and pragmatic steps to foster more democratic structures for health risk governance.
Throughout, I seek to develop an analysis based in legal and political theory to illuminate
how the practices and institutions of risk governance drive the contemporary American health
care system.
I. A THEORY OF RISK GOVERNANCE IN HEALTH CARE
The story of the late twentieth century health care system is the story of the rise of risk as an
organizing principle. 3 In health care, risk has dual dimensions: the financial risk of providing and
3

My argument about the political and intellectual dominance of risk analysis in health care draws on an emerging
body of work in legal theory and the sociology of law that examines how the framework of risk has developed into
an explanatory model extending to fields such as criminal law and social welfare policy. Two leading scholars in the
field, Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, have analyzed the spread of risk discourse from the insurance context into a
variety of legal mechanisms for “governing through risk.” Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 11 (Tom Baker & Jonathan
Simon eds., 2002). I share Baker and Simon’s orientation in focusing on the social construction of risk: “we are less
interested in what is a risk than we are in what is done in the name of risk.” Id. at 18. Perhaps the most
comprehensive single treatment of the impact of risk analysis on jurisprudence is JENNY STEELE, RISKS AND LEGAL
THEORY (2004). Steele, a British law professor, explores a number of different approaches to risk, including its
usefulness as a “collective technology” relevant to issues of distributive justice. Id. at 33–38, 57. Jonathan Simon’s
work examines risk discourse in criminal law, arguing that it constitutes a “powerful” tool “with which to interpret
and frame all forms of social action as a problem for governance.” JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
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paying for health care and the clinical risk of illness and death. Neither category is new to health
care. What has changed dramatically has been the relative importance of and interpenetration
between these two dimensions of risk.
The concern paid in the health care system today to financial risk is inextricably intertwined
with the attention paid to clinical risk. At the systemic level of health care delivery, one can no
longer fully separate the management of care and of clinical risk from the management of
financial risk. Clinical and administrative techniques designed to control some aspect of risk
have reshaped the practice of medicine, resulting in what I call “actuarial medicine.” Doctors and
patients function today, however hesitantly or reluctantly, as prime actors in an economy of risk.
This Part analyzes how governance organized around risk allocation has become a dominant
force in the health care system. Because risk governance is a relatively new concept in legal
scholarship, section A defines that term and argues that a discourse of risk managerialism is the
driving force behind governance in our contemporary health care system. Section B describes the
material bases that contributed to the rise of risk managerialism and that resulted in the actuarial
medicine we have today. It also describes the new knowledges that support the practice of
actuarial medicine and exposes the normative issues underlying the system. 4
A. GOVERNANCE THROUGH A DISCOURSE OF RISK MANAGERIALISM

This Article refers to a system of “governance,” rather than to the prohibitory or regulatory
products of “government.” That is because governance analysis permits us to move easily back
and forth across public-private boundaries, providing insights into a unified discourse that
channels the actions of providers, payers, and patients, whether in public or private health care
systems. 5
Using the conceptual framework of governance foregrounds the insight that “‘the conduct of
conduct’” 6 involves power exchanges that cross the borders between government, the market,
civil society, and private life. Rather than a model of social control that emanates from actions of
the state, governance theory begins with an understanding that the channeling of actions,
resources, and policies is far more complex than a top-down model implies. “Governance”
denotes a conceptualization of power that is circular rather than subject-verb-object
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 17
(2007). Commenting on future directions, Mariana Valverde et al. call for more study of “what kinds of risk
knowledge moves are made by the various participants in particular legal networks, and with what legal, social and
epistemological effects.” Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledges of Risks, in LAW AND RISK 86, 87 (Law
Comm’n of Can. ed., 2005). This Article offers a response to Valverde, in the context of health law.
4
My analysis of risk governance in health care is also a friendly amendment to the characterization by several health
policy experts that the late-twentieth-century period marked the “industrialization” of American health care. See
Gary S. Belkin, The Technocratic Wish: Making Sense and Finding Power in the “Managed” Medical Marketplace,
22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 509, 510 (1997); J.D. Kleinke, The Industrialization of Health Care, 278 JAMA
1456 (1997). While many of the elements of industrialization, such as standardization, apply to the changes in the
health care system that I will analyze, others, such as greater division of labor, do not. Moreover, I would argue that
understanding the changes as a shift from the primacy of concern with clinical risk to at least an equal concern with
financial risk provides a stronger framework for analyzing health care than the industrialization model, which is
better suited for manufacturing enterprises.
5
See generally Nan D. Hunter, “Public-Private” Health Law: New Directions in Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 89 (2007) [hereinafter Hunter, Public-Private Health Law] (describing governance and governmentality
theories both generally and specifically within health care).
6
Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 1, 2 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (quoting Michel Foucault).
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unidirectional, networked rather than hierarchical, and multi-dimensional beyond the state,
encompassing nonjuridical zones such as market forces or culture. 7 Governing, in this sense, is
comprehensive and multidimensional; it is “to structure the possible field of action of others.” 8
For legal scholars, governance theory offers a rich method for analyzing the intersection of
law and norms, of legal and extra-legal discourses. Law can be understood as one set of
institutional practices and embodied understandings that may be manifest in public or private
sector policies, knowledges, social relations and identities. 9 Norms may serve the objectives of a
variety of regulatory institutions, including but not limited to the state.
The conceptualization of governance as occurring as much through private as through public
sector mechanisms fits particularly well with the American health care system, with its thorough
intermingling of public and private structures. Public financing systems underwrite private sector
health care for 87 million Americans through the Medicare and Medicaid systems. 10 The
privately financed workplace system of health insurance depends on a hefty public subsidy
through tax law. 11 American hospitals are a mix of public and private institutions, the latter
including both for-profit and not-for-profit corporate forms. 12 Licensing decisions are made by
state agencies for individual physicians, 13 while a private accreditation organization provides the
most significant oversight for hospitals. 14 Statutory authority in forty-one states and the District

7

See Hunter, Public-Private Health Law, supra note 5, at 91–92. This description captures the strand of governance
best categorized as governmentality theory. See id. at 90–92 (making distinctions between three concepts of
governance: dominant state authority; public-private models for administrative governance (often called “new
governance” or “administrative governance”); and governmentality). For purposes of this Article, I draw from both
administrative governance and governmentality literature.
8
3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Subject and Power, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954–1984, at 326,
341 (James D. Faubion ed., 2000).
9
See ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 46–
50 (1994); Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449, 452–63 (1996)
(book review).
10
Medicare covers slightly more than 44 million persons. See StateHealthFacts.org, Total Number of Medicare
Beneficiaries, 2008, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=290&cat=6 (last visited May 24,
2008). Medicaid covers just under 43 million. See StateHealthFacts.org, Monthly Medicaid Enrollment, December
2006, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=201&cat=4 (last visited May 24, 2008. Both
numbers include more than six million “dual eligibles,” persons enrolled in both programs, an overlap
structured so that the Medicaid programs pays Medicare premiums for persons who qualify for Medicare
but lack the funds to pay the premiums. See http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?cb=50&sctn=136 (last visited
August 8, 2008).
11
See ALLEGRA N. KIM, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, FED. TAX INCENTIVES FOR HEALTH INS. 1–4 (2007), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/07/02/07-002.pdf; see also U.S. CONG., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW
AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT OF HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER HEALTH EXPENSES
(2006), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-27-06.pdf. In 2004, the total federal and state tax subsidy for
employment-based coverage amounted to just under $210 billion. See John Sheils & Randall Haught, The Cost of
Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, HEALTH AFF., W4-109 exh.1 (Feb. 25, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.106v1.
12
See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit
Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346–48 (2002–2003).
13
See ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, CONFRONTATION, AND
COMPROMISE 22–24 (2007).
14
See id. at 44–46; see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government
Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate?, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54–55
(1994).
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of Columbia permit private sector judging companies to run the appeal systems for the denial of
private or public system health insurance coverage. 15
In these myriad ways, the fusion of public and private characterizes virtually every aspect of
American health care and health law, to the point that health law cannot be confidently
categorized today as either public law or private law. Because public-private hybridity is also
intrinsic to governance theory, the logical structure of a governance model is closely homologous
to the public-private institutional structure of the health care system. It is a natural fit.
If we think of governance metaphorically as a kind of epistemological meta-technology, 16
we can imagine it as providing the framework for channeling the various substantive and
ideological streams that circulate through any number of institutions. Using this model for
purposes of analyzing the health care system, I suggest we think of a discourse of risk
managerialism as the substantive core, the driving force, behind the dynamics of governance in
our contemporary health care system.
Risk managerialism means the framing of the practices of medical institutions, and the
correlative legal doctrines of health law, around the project of allocating various forms of risk. In
concrete terms, risk managerialism operates through the alignment of incentives and deterrents
for actors, throughout the health care system, based on probabilities that can be calculated. 17
I explore in more specificity below the knowledges created in the health care system that
instantiate risk managerialism. But a factor central to the impact of risk managerialism is the
extent to which it alters the very identities and social relations associated with medical practice.
In a watershed moment in 1978, Alain Enthoven called for physicians to shift away from their
traditional approach to medical care as an art of healing and to move toward quantitative
techniques in their delivery of health care. 18 His description of “a synthesis of principles of
economics, statistics, probability, and decision theory [to be] applied to the complex and
uncertain problems of medical decision making” 19 could serve as a definition of the forms of risk
analysis that dominate health care practice today.
Enthoven’s primary motivation for suggesting such a shift was not to minimize financial risk
for providers. That story was yet to come. Rather, his objective was to increase the cost
effectiveness of medical care. 20 But his argument was of a piece with those beginning to be made
by one of his Stanford colleagues, David Eddy, whose work drove the movement for evidencebased medicine: the claim that statistical analysis of outcomes should drive clinical decisions. 21
Evidence-based medicine has spawned a cultural revolution within the profession, one that is still
under attack from many physicians as “cookbook medicine.” 22
15

See Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6 YALE J.HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 93, 93 (2006).
16
I use this phrase to mean a broadly conceptual mechanism for framing our understanding of how systems and
institutions function and toward what ends.
17
See STEELE, supra note 3, at 6–7, 18–20; Francois Ewald, Norms, Discipline and the Law, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
138, 142–44 (Spring 1990).
18
See Alain C. Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture—Cutting Cost Without Cutting the Quality of Care, 298 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1229 (1978).
19
Id. at 1236.
20
Id. at 1229.
21
See, e.g., MICHAEL L. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DOCTORS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 49–50, 128–36, 336–40 (1997).
22
See Trisha Greenhalgh, Narrative-Based Medicine in an Evidence-Based World, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 323 (1999);
Marshall B. Kapp, “Cookbook” Medicine: A Legal Perspective, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 496 (1990). But see
KATHRYN MONTGOMERY, HOW DOCTORS THINK: CLINICAL JUDGMENT AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 206 (2006)
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Actuarial techniques and practices have begun to foster new subjective identities for patients
as well as for physicians. Just as ethical standards for professionals have been reshaped to
incorporate a conscious knowledge of financial as well as clinical risk, so too have the norms
changed for the responsible patient, who is now expected to do her part for the greater good by
consuming health care prudentially. One aspect of the doctrine of moral hazard is that insurers
seek to minimize pooling those risks which individuals can control. 23 The civic duty of selfmanagement has become a central part of the rhetoric of health care policy, embedded in
narratives that merge concepts of what is healthy, what is insurable and what is ethical. 24
B. THE RISE OF ACTUARIAL MEDICINE

1. Material Bases
A number of factors gave rise to risk managerialism as the dominant discourse of
governance in our health care system. The primary causes were the hyperinflation in the health
care industry during the 1970s and 1980s; the influence of neoclassical economists who
dominated the policy scene at the time and provided the intellectual support for using financial
risk to manage costs; and finally, the resulting dominance of managed care over fee-for-service
delivery systems, with myriad approaches used by managed care structures, and sometimes by
doctors themselves, to shift financial risk to providers.
Inflation was widespread in the American economy in the 1970s, but it was worse in health
care than in other sectors. Annual gross expenditure levels in medical care began to spike in the
late 1970s, producing a rate of inflation that was a multiple of the inflation in other sectors. 25
These cost increases affected not only payers of health care (primarily insurance companies), but
also purchasers of health insurance, such as employers. From 1976 to 1988, the cost of

(defending the role of statistical studies in clinical judgment). The impact on the profession has spread beyond the
United States. See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 104–09 (1997) (describing the
adoption of “clinical audit” systems by Britain’s National Health Service).
23
In general, moral hazard refers to the incentive provided by insurance to engage in actions that, without insurance,
one would be reluctant to take. Insurers thus prefer to offer policies protecting against risks over which an insured
lacks control rather than those which an insured can decide to assume. CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND
RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 9, 149–50 (1985).
24
One of countless possible examples would be a newspaper advertisement by an insurance company exhorting
readers “to be healthier in mind and body” and “to change your life for the better and the good.” See Sarah
Nettleton, Governing the Risky Self: How to Become Healthy, Wealthy and Wise, in FOUCAULT: HEALTH AND
MEDICINE 207, 207 (Alan Peterson & Robin Bunton eds., 1997). The health narrative fits into a long history of
insurance companies relying on eligibility criteria that turn on the good or bad “characters” of those applying for
coverage. See Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 559, 561 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Insuring
Morality]; Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 779, 785 (2000).
25
The inflation rate in the medical sector compared to the overall U.S. inflation rate was 8.7% versus 5.5% from
1980 to 1985; 7.5% versus 4.0% from 1985 to 1990; and 6.3% versus 3.1% from 1990 to 1995. See Andre Hampton,
Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 489, 502 n.78 (1998). As Henry Aaron and Joseph Newhouse pointed out, it is important to note that
“inflation” can be a misleading term with regard to health care because, although medical sector expenses have
unquestionably shot up, the data do not tell us how much of the increase is attributable to inflationary prices for
essentially the same product and how much reflects increased prices for increased quality. See HENRY J. AARON,
SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE 41–42 (1991) (quoting in part Joseph
Newhouse).
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employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) doubled. 26 After a pause in the mid-1990s, the sharp
upward spiral in costs has resumed. 27 Between 2002 and 2007, the cumulative growth in health
insurance premiums was seventy-eight percent, far outstripping rates of inflation and wage
growth. 28
How situations are defined, of course, establishes the parameters for what kinds of policy
responses “make sense.” The economics-oriented experts who had “outlived, outtheorized, and
outmaneuvered” those who saw the health care system more in political or social welfare terms 29
framed “the health polity as a sector of the economy.” 30 They argued that budget-breaking costs
had created the problem and that new forms of financial discipline could become the solution.
Indeed, for the neoclassical economists who were achieving political and intellectual dominance
at the time, health care was a perfect problem on which to train their attention. The problem was
of enduring urgency, and it was occurring in an economic zone where few market models had
already failed because so few had been tried.
In this environment, the goal of controlling costs leapt to the top of the health policy agenda
and has remained there ever since. Both payers and purchasers, in both public and private
sectors, embarked on a series of initiatives designed to curb costs. 31
The initial focus of this campaign centered on influencing physicians to incorporate cost
consciousness and fiscal discipline into their provision of services, a consciousness and
discipline perceived as generally lacking in the fee-for-service system. 32 An early byproduct of
those efforts was utilization review—the calculation of the number and nature of treatments
prescribed, by patient and by physician. 33 Data from utilization review were used to create
treatment norms for particular conditions and to deny reimbursement when services were
provided for treatments outside the norm. The assumption was that providers would incorporate
these lessons of reimbursement denials into the future provision of services. When that discipline
proved inadequate, utilization review achieved a more direct cost control by setting up
26

Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, The Reconfiguration of U.S. Medicine, 274 JAMA 85, 87 (1995).
John K. Iglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 956, 957 (2002); Bradley C. Strunk
et al., Tracking Health Care Costs, HEALTH AFF., ¶ 9 & exh.1 (Sept. 26, 2001),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w1.39v1/DC1 (showing that the rate of increase in health care
spending dropped below the growth rate in gross domestic product during 1994–1997, but outpaced it in subsequent
years).
28
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2007 ANNUAL
SURVEY 18, 19 exh.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf.
29
Daniel M. Fox, Health Policy and the Politics of Research in the United States, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
481, 496 (1990).
30
Id. at 489.
31
See id. at 495; see also Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 87; Peter Swenson & Scott Greer, Foul
Weather Friends: Big Business and Health Care Reform in the 1990s in Historical Perspective, 27 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 605, 609–610 (2002).
32
In the fee-for-service system, insurers deferred to the certification by providers that the treatments and services
which they had provided were medically necessary and reimbursement followed. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING
MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS & ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 66–67 (1997). This is
not to say, of course, that physicians had no awareness of the financial incentives that were created by the indemnity
method of reimbursement. See Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor As Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural
Icon, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 533, 534 (1997) (arguing that “the role of money in the doctor-patient
relationship” has long been controversial ).
33
A typical definition of utilization review is the following, taken from the Maine Department of Insurance: “[a]
program used in managed care plans . . . [involving reviews of] the necessity, use, appropriateness, efficacy or
efficiency of health care services, procedures, providers, or facilities.” Maine Bureau of Insurance, Glossary of
Insurance Terms, http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/glossary.htm.
27
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monitoring and policing procedures by which payers denied reimbursement in advance for care
that fell outside the treatment norms for a particular condition. 34 A similar process occurred with
hospitals. 35
But utilization review, whether retrospective or prospective, was only the tip of the iceberg.
Denials of reimbursement, or required pre-approval of services, could still be consistent with a
fee-for-service structure. The real story began to happen at the institutional level.
The 1990s saw a massive transformation to managed care structures for the delivery of
health care services. The essence of managed care is non-fee-for-service reimbursement of
providers, combined with delivery mechanisms that limit care, such as primary physicians who
function as “gatekeepers” for referrals to specialists and limited provider networks. 36 Large
health insurance purchasers, primarily employers who sponsor workplace-based group plans,
increasingly opted for the cost savings promised by managed care oversight of expenses. 37 By
1999, all but eight percent of those who had insurance through their workplace were enrolled in
health care plans that were based on some form of managed care. 38
A variety of options were used in these plans to structure the contractual agreements with
providers in a manner that would control costs. Traditional health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) constituted only a small segment of the options used. 39 Most options built on existing
provider structures but entailed some form of assumption of risk by the provider. Downstreaming of financial risk to providers through capitation systems was the most common
approach. 40 “Capitation” refers to the practice by which a provider would agree to accept a
patient for a set reimbursement amount paid each month (regardless of the actual services used
by the patient) and would commit to providing that patient with all needed services. The provider
then carried the burden of ensuring that her pool of patients included the right mix to result in a
profit at the end of the year. 41
Down-streaming of financial risk to providers through capitation systems was generally
paired with down-streaming of utilization management. 42 Once providers began bearing the
financial risk of providing services to patients, many payers saw advantages in allowing those
same providers to have control over their utilization management, allowing the risk-bearing
entity to control its own costs. 43
These institutional changes continued in a cascading series of developments. Solo and smallgroup physician practices consolidated into larger entities to achieve greater efficiency and

34

See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1637, 1652–54 (1992).
35
See, e.g., Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
36
PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA 8 (2002).
37
See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 87–88; JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE
GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY 14–15 (1997) [hereinafter HACKER, THE ROAD TO
NOWHERE].
38
See R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1087 (2001).
39
HMOs are one form of managed-care organizations. They are more tightly structured and more closely regulated
than other forms. See GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 412 (8th ed. 2003).
40
See Thomas Rice, Financial Incentives as a Cost-Control Mechanism in Managed Care, in THE PRIVATIZATION
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 99, 103 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).
41
See id. at 101.
42
See Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era of “Systems-Think”: The Implications
for Managed Care Organizational Liability and Patient Safety, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 292 (2001).
43
Id.
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control in their pools of patients. 44 Scaling up, networks of these providers, including hospitals,
formed. 45 As James Robinson, a leading economist, has noted: “[t]he growth and diffusion of the
multi-specialty medical group, paid prospectively and delegated authority for utilization
management, is the single most important development in the contemporary organization of
medicine.” 46
As provider entities and networks grew larger, some sought to maximize their revenue and
control by cutting out the managed care organization (MCO) completely and directly offering
their own managed care products. 47 Professional societies, such as the American Medical
Association, provided technical and financial support to doctors who were developing business
models that involved assuming insurance-style risk on their own. 48 And as a surge of such
networks declared bankruptcy, 49 state insurance commissioners began to wrestle with whether or
how to classify medical practitioners as insurers for purposes of establishing criteria for solvency
and rate-setting. 50
2. Actuarial Medicine
Specific financing arrangements in managed care are, of course, “constantly adapting and
changing,” and “‘bedside’ rationing” incentives “vary in their intensity.” 51 But by the mid-1990s,
all three of the economic dynamics I describe above—massive cost increases, the dominance of
managed care over fee-for-service, and the undertaking of financial risk directly by physicians
and other providers—had taken hold.
The result is what I call “actuarial medicine.” 52 In today’s health care system, the merger of
coverage and care decisionmaking means that “the calculation between cost and clinical
44

In 1983, 75.8% of physicians were self-employed, including 40.5% in solo practices; 24.2% were employees of
managed care or other organizations. In 1999, the self-employed figure had dropped to 61.8%, with only 28.4% in
solo practice. The percentage of physicians who were employees had risen by more than 50%, to 38.2%. The trend
is even more pronounced among new practitioners. See Dudley & Luft, supra note 38, at 1089. Another study
examined the number of physicians who practiced either alone or with one other physician, and found that there was
a decrease from 40.7% in 1996–1997 to 32.5% in 2004–2005. See Allison Liebhaber & Joy M. Grossman,
Physicians Moving to Mid-Sized, Single-Specialty Practices, 18 CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE
TRACKING REPORT 1 Fig.1 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/941/941.pdf.
45
See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN HEALTH
CARE 211 (1999) [hereinafter ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE].
46
Id. at 91.
47
See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 26, at 88–89; Dudley & Luft, supra note 38, at 1088.
48
The American Medical Association (AMA) established a Physicians Capital Source project in 1994 to match
doctors with investors and to furnish assistance in writing business plans and on general management questions. One
AMA official stated that “[p]hysicians are very concerned about whether they will have a place in the market of the
future.” Alicia Ault Barnett, Do Health Plans Change Course When Doctors Take the Helm?, 13 BUS. & HEALTH
32, 32 (1995).
49
See Brant S. Mittler & André Hampton, The Princess and the Pea: The Assurance of Voluntary Compliance
Between the Texas Attorney General and Aetna’s Texas HMOs and Its Impact on Financial Risk Shifting by
Managed Care, 83 B.U.L. REV. 553, 563–67 (2003).
50
See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 232; Ericka L. Rutenberg, Managed Care and the
Business of Insurance: When Is a Provider Group Considered To Be at Risk?, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 267,
267 (1996). In 1995, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners issued guidelines for the regulation of
such arrangements under state insurance codes. Id. For a case study of how one state used its regulatory powers to
cope with medical practices assuming financial risk, see Mittler & Hampton, supra note 49, at 572–577.
51
Noble & Brennan, supra note 42, at 292.
52
The term “actuarial medicine” has not previously been used in legal scholarship.
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effectiveness is no longer a struggle between physician and insurer; rather, it becomes
incorporated into the physician’s own clinical decisionmaking process.” 53
The goal of actuarial fairness is central to insurance. It requires the accurate pricing of risk,
so that an insurer charges each group or individual no more and no less in premiums than is
necessary to cover the cost of future claims, plus administrative expenses and a reasonable
profit. 54 The bedrock philosophy underlying insurance law is to facilitate the achievement of
actuarial fairness. 55 Health insurance is but one example of actuarial fairness in action (or in
dispute).
The downshifting of financial risk in the health care system has produced something new:
actuarial fairness as a concept within medicine itself. From the provider’s point of view, actuarial
fairness within medicine means pricing one’s bundle of services so as to produce enough income
to cover the cost of providing those services to the purchaser’s enrollees for the length of the
contract, plus overhead and reasonable profit. This is the financial face of managed care as seen
by the provider, and it is the primary component of actuarial medicine.
The legal linchpin for actuarial medicine to work is an interpretation of “medically
necessary” that allows for the consideration of costs in determining appropriate treatment.
“Medically necessary” is a radically imprecise term which has foundational importance in the
health care and health law system: it is the measure for whether treatments and services are
covered by health insurance contracts. But while almost endless variations exist for the meaning
of this key phrase, 56 what many of them share is an allowance for the consideration of cost. In a
comprehensive review of statutes and case law, health services research literature, industry
documents, and trade journals, Rosenbaum et al. concluded that a consensus has emerged that
“medically necessary” should be defined as “multi-dimensional,” to include factors such as cost
and relative effectiveness. 57 This approach essentially ensures that the ultimate measure of what
will be “medically necessary” will be which treatment option, among those that are reasonably
believed to be equal in safety and efficacy, costs the least.
In my view, “medically necessary” remains the universally used term because, not in
spite of, the lack of a fixed definition. Its indeterminacy creates a zone in which incommensurate
values such as cost-benefit analysis and compassion are expected and accommodated, if not
exactly encouraged. The decisionmaking point can slide along a scale of multiple actors who are
53

Kleinke, The Industrialization of Health Care, supra note 4, at 1457.
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 83–89 (1986).
55
See Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1809–1812 (1987).
56
A team of researchers from George Washington University reviewing the literature found dozens of different
definitions in legal and extra-legal sources. See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICAL NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE 45–63, 66–69
(2003). In addition to the materials covered by the Rosenbaum study, federal law allows the insurance companies
that act as fiscal intermediaries or contractors in the Medicare system to define what is medically necessary in
varying ways. See Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations Revisited: Abuse of
Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 91, 102
(1999). State Medicaid programs employ yet additional definitions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-144 (West
2007). Yet other definitions emerged from the settlement of a class action brought by physicians who alleged that
insurers misrepresented their payment policies in violation of RICO. Each of the major insurance companies settled
on terms that included both definitions of “medically necessary” and special arbitration systems for resolving
disputes. See, e.g., CAL. MED. ASSOC., HEALTH NET SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW 1 (2005), available at
http://www.cmanet.org/upload/FinalSettlementOverviewHealthNet.pdf.
57
ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 56, at 7, 26.
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involved at different points in treatment and coverage determinations. Risk—both clinical and
financial—is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated, assumed and shifted, in the
interactions that identify what counts as medically necessary.
C. THE ARCHITECTURE OF KNOWLEDGES

Risk governance in health care is grounded in the material realities of actuarial medicine that
I have just described. But the impact of such governance goes beyond simple cost cutting or
complex new delivery structures. At its heart, and essential to its success, are a set of new
knowleges created by the health care system.
Intellectually, the financial side of health care has more than kept pace with the clinical side.
Health care protocols have shifted from a mindset of responding to unique episodic events
presented by single patients to a mindset of anticipating certain occurrences with a statistically
determined regularity, offering insurers and purchasers of large group plans the promise of an
ability to govern the future.
Forms of knowledge based on statistical calculation provide the mechanisms by which the
cost containment reforms described above are able to take hold. New technologies of
measurement and evaluation that have developed within the health care system now enable the
aggregation of treatment knowledge based on the systematic reporting of outcomes. 58 This
synthesized data produces new knowledge. Larger physician practices and institutional provider
networks enable the easy aggregation of data, and price competition puts a premium on the
reliability of such data.
Experience rating, the pricing of insurance for a given group based on past claims, 59 is not
new. But the standardization of encounter and treatment data fields has enabled a quantum leap
in the sophistication of predictive models. 60 Risk managers use data produced by multiprovider
networks and institutions to measure and analyze patterns of care, 61 and outcomes research has
become a major field within the medical academy. 62
The production of more than 2,000 clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) over roughly the past
decade 63—guidance protocols for physicians to use in deciding upon a course of treatment 64—
illustrates how various disciplinary regimes within medicine have evolved together in a
symbiotic, synergistic fashion in the generation of a discourse of risk managerialism. The
government, 65 the medical profession, 66 and private market entities 67 all aligned in their support
58

See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 115.
See, e.g., AARON, supra note 25, at 31–33; ABRAHAM, supra note 54, at 91.
60
See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines,
26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 328 (2001).
61
See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 159, 204–05 (Spring 1997).
62
See J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal System Confronts the Technocratic
Wish, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L 275, 279–83 (1999).
63
See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 417–18 (2002).
64
The Institute of Medicine defines CPG’s as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.” INST. OF MED., COMM. TO ADVISE THE
PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW
PROGRAM 38 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990).
65
When Congress created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) in 1987, the agency’s primary
mission was to use outcomes research to produce national guidelines for common medical procedures. See
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for the development of CPGs and participated in the development of such guidelines. CPGs are
an ingenious device for addressing both financial and clinical risk, in essence marrying defensive
medicine to cost control, rationalized by the discourse of science. 68
The process of the institutionalization of CPGs by law is well underway. Courts have begun
to allow use of CPGs as evidence of the standard of care to which physicians should be held in
malpractice litigation. 69 And although there are differing views among scholars regarding the
utility of CPGs in determining the outcome of cases, 70 litigators are nonetheless using them to
screen cases. 71
Even without any explicit intervention by or interaction with a court, CPGs are effectively
enforced simply through the contract terms between physicians and payers. They serve a
disciplinary function through a norming effect. The widespread presence of such guidelines
creates pressure for physicians to conform to what are promoted as “best” clinical practices. 72
In response to various forms of public pressure, insurers have recently loosened the
strictness of the direct financial incentives placed on physicians. 73 At the same time, however,
the reliance on CPGs has dramatically increased. The percentage of physicians reporting that
treatment guidelines had a “moderate” to “very large” impact on their practices increased by ten
points from 1997 to 2001, to 56.2% of all physicians and 60.7% of primary care doctors. 74 As

Matthews, supra note 62, at 282 . One can now view hundreds of guidelines through the agency’s website. (AHCRP
was renamed the Agency for Health Research and Quality.) Agency for Health Research and Quality, Clinical
Practice Guidelines, http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgsix.htm (follow “National Guideline Clearinghouse” hyperlink).
66
The Institute of Medicine issued a laudatory report on CPGs in 1990, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note
64, and dozens of professional societies have issued their own guidelines. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and
Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 650
(2001).
67
For managed care organizations and other insurers, guideline development grew easily out of the methodology of
utilization review. See Mello, supra note 66, at 651–52.
68
“[M]odern health plans virtually cannot operate without using some sort of clinical guidelines to decide which
care is covered under the plan.” E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 1001 (1999). Gary Belkin argues that only a scientific rationale could
have succeeded in threading the needle of cost-reduction pressure and professional pride. See Belkin, supra note 4,
at 518.
69
A number of courts have allowed a physician to defeat a malpractice claim by demonstrating that she followed the
professional norm in her treatment decisions; fewer courts have allowed their use by plaintiffs to establish a breach
of the standard of care. See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 289, 295–96 (1996); see also Noah, supra note 63, at 462–63.
70
See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice
Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 990 (2005) (endorsing judicial
reliance on CPGs in malpractice litigation); Mello, supra note 66, at 708–10 (opposing); William R. Trail & Brad A.
Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora’s Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231,
251–58 (1996) (endorsing their use only as an affirmative defense).
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Hyams et al., supra note 69, at 292.
72
See Valverde, Legal Knowledges of Risks, supra note 3, at 93 (describing best-practices guides as “‘normalizing’
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See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427, 441–
43 (2005); Bradley C. Strunk & James D. Reschovsky, Kinder and Gentler: Physicians and Managed Care, 1997–
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Strunk & Reschovsky, supra note 73, at 3–4.
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with the more obvious financial incentives, the CPGs are likely to induce slower, but perhaps
more entrenched, norm change over time. 75
From the confluence of these economic, technological and intellectual developments, a
common managerial discourse centered on risk now dominates health care. Increasing
sophistication of statistics-based technologies of knowledge facilitates risk-allocation decisions
that are at once both more precise and effective, and less obviously intrusive, than the cruder
mechanisms of earlier stages of managed care. The distribution of financial risk in the health care
system, once set and relatively stable (that is, a physician provides the service and gets paid), is
now continuously evolving. And physicians, care-giving institutions, financers of care, and,
increasingly, patients 76 all participate in these evolving decisions.
II. RISK GOVERNANCE AS A PARADIGM FOR HEALTH LAW
Law regulates roles and institutions, and new vectors of risk have profoundly changed the
roles and institutions within medicine. In this section, I return to the perennial “law of the horse”
problem and argue that understanding health law through the lens of risk governance offers
greater intellectual coherence for the field than other frameworks that have been suggested.
Section A provides an overview of the frameworks currently in use for understanding health law
as a field and makes the case for the greater explanatory power of a risk-governance paradigm.
Section B offers, as a concrete example of such explanatory power, judicial changes in the
meaning of “fiduciary” in the health care context.
A. PARADIGMS OF HEALTH LAW

The material forces I describe above have catapulted the field of health law into a state of
confusion. At a symposium convened in 2005 to “rethink” the field, 77 speakers described health
law as “not yet a coherent field of law . . . . [but] rather, a disjointed set of statutes and
doctrines,” 78 one with “rules [that] come flying from all directions with no one taking the trouble
to make them consistent,” 79 and haunted by “the specter of exhaustion” caused by the recycling
of two intellectually spent explanatory paradigms: patient autonomy and market theory. 80
Efforts to redeem this “substantive cacophony” 81 have emerged intermittently since the early
1980s, when the American Society of Law and Medicine commissioned a task force to review
the teaching of health law. 82 But none of the explanatory frameworks proposed so far is adequate
to conceptualize contemporary health care and health law.
75

Cf. Arti K. Rai, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: A Tale of Behavior Induced by Payment Structure, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 579, 583–85 (2001) (explaining the role of financial incentives in changing physician behavior).
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Insurers stung by the cost in goodwill from the backlash against managed care increasingly have developed
product lines that shift elevated levels of financial risk to patient-consumers, through health savings accounts and
higher co-pays and deductibles. See ROBINSON, CORPORATE PRACTICE, supra note 45, at 83–87.
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Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law: Introduction, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (2006).
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Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law? 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006).
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Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care: Spanning the Boundary Between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 465, 466 (2006).
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Hall et al., supra note 77.
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Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347,
354 (2006).
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See AM. SOC’Y LAW AND MED., HEALTH LAW AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
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The defense of health law as a coherent and independent field has long centered on the
unique presence of professional authority. For example, the professional custom standard in
medical malpractice law established a singular rule for tort liability in health care cases. 83 In
other doctrinal categories of law as well, judicial recognition of the particularity of the
physician’s role has created exceptions to general legal principles, cumulatively forming a zone
of unique law. 84 Similar to the manner in which family law was understood as founded on a set
of altered standards for property, tort and contract designed to accommodate the dynamics of
intimate life experience, health law was understood as resting on, and defined by, a set of
doctrinal anomalies centered on professional autonomy.
Health law’s claim to distinctiveness has diminished, however, in light of the growing focus
on and role of economics in the health care system. From its original core centered on the legal
oversight of the doctor-patient relationship, health law has grown with its field, becoming a
complex edifice of heavily statutory law regulating thousands of health-care-related entities. 85 As
health care has in fact become an industry, at least in scale, issues of economic theory have
become more urgent, and economics-based approaches to regulation have come to the fore in
health law, as they have in health policy more generally. Within health law, the zone concerned
with institutional liability and cost-benefit regulatory issues expanded, as medical practice
shifted away from dominance by independent professionals to large networks of practitioners
who contracted with each other and with large institutions to acquire access to larger patient
markets. 86
In light of these changes, academic debate has stalemated about which of three centers of
gravity best define the core of health law today: the doctor-patient relationship, economics, or
regulation. No adherent of any theory denies the existence of the forces highlighted by the other
theories; rather, the debate centers on how to best capture the uniqueness and coherence (if any)
of health law. In addition, each theory has its own internal conversation that occurs between
adherents sharing its particular worldview.
The most traditional rendition of health law is the “essentialist” view, 87 centered on the
“relational web” between provider and patient. 88 This approach frames the field as dominated by
a core of professional authority, including the privilege of self-regulation accorded to physicians
and the fiduciary duty of physicians towards their patients. The internal conversation within this
worldview focuses on how the core of professional authority operates synergistically but in
tension with rights accorded to patient autonomy. 89
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The second candidate for intellectual dominance is the economics approach that emphasizes
the role of health law in facilitating private market forces. 90 This approach centers on the unique
economic dynamics of the health care market, bedeviled by highly asymmetric information
resources, a history of supplier-induced demand, and the fact that many consumers of care
(particularly individuals in large group plans) are not the primary payers for that care. 91 Critics
counter the economics-centered worldview by invoking physicians’ professional norms of
compassion and rescue to counter a solely economic analysis. 92
A third approach views health law as a form of regulatory law, focusing on the role of the
state in balancing the tension between the need for broader access to health care and the need to
control costs. 93 While this is similar to the regulatory law applicable to most economic sectors
that mediate a power struggle between the state and the market, the internal conversation within
this worldview centers on two dynamics that distinguish the regulatory landscape of health care.
First, health regulation represents a struggle among three centers of power, as opposed to the
normal dichotomous power contest between the state and entities in the private market. The third
player—the profession—retains some degree of self-regulatory leeway, and allies itself
sometimes with the regulators, sometimes with market entities. 94 Second, there is deep social
ambivalence about whether health care should be considered a public good or a commodity. 95 As
a result, there are only provisional and unstable resolutions of political questions about how
much access should be guaranteed by public mechanisms.
None of these paradigms, however, can claim dominance as a satisfactory rationale for
health law as a coherent field. Placing any one of them at the center of a concept of health law
today omits too much of what constitutes the core of legal regulation of the health care system. A
distinctive tort liability standard and the (diminishing) scope of autonomous self-regulation that
furnish much of the basis for the essentialist view provide us with little insight into insurance or
financial risk questions in health law. Market-oriented perspectives centered in antitrust, tax law,
and the analysis of financial incentive structures as market interventions discount the doctorpatient relationship and equity questions. Focusing on federal and state regulation of health care
misses many of the private investment and liability issues.
One response to the scholarly stalemate seeks a legal process kind of solution—focusing on
institutional competence and drawing on different frameworks for different problems. 96 A major
proponent of this approach, Einer Elhauge, has argued for a “comparative paradigm analysis” 97
through which certain decisions would be effectively assigned to different systems. For example,
establishing a national budget for health care costs might be best decided through laws resulting
from the political and regulatory process, while ensuring competitive service suppliers for
consumers might be best achieved through laws that facilitate market forces. 98 But this approach
90
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essentially consists of a decisionmaking heuristic that might be applied in any number of fields.
It does not purport to offer a comprehensive intellectual framework for understanding health law.
My argument is that the best way to understand health law is to focus not on the tension
between the three centers of power comprised of the state, the market and the profession, but
rather on the extraordinarily complex synchronicity among these three centers. And at the heart
of this synchronicity lie decisions about risk.
Health care delivery systems, financing and payment structures, and bureaucracies of
government regulating all aspects of health care together comprise a set of unrelated, but
nonetheless deeply connected, public and private institutions of collective risk allocation and
management. Understanding health law as a discourse that reacts to and facilitates the flow of
practices and policies that address financial risk, and how it interacts with clinical risk, offers us
a more holistic and integrated approach to the field. Moreover, a focus on risk suggests a path
around the traditional division in legal doctrine between public and private realms, which has
obscured the matrix of how power actually flows within the health care system. 99
Informed consent doctrine provides one example of how a focus on concepts of risk knits
together disparate structures within the health care system in a holistic manner. Informed consent
law began as an anti-paternalism mechanism, using tort doctrine to remedy the power
inequalities in the doctor-patient relationship by forcing disclosure of information about clinical
risk material to the patient’s decisionmaking. 100
But informed consent law today is also being looked to as a possible means for addressing
information asymmetries with regard to how doctors manage their financial risks. For example,
informed consent law is currently grappling with when and by whom patients should be
informed of the financial incentives that affect almost every physician’s compensation. 101
Performance data about individual doctors and hospitals could conceivably be incorporated into
the consent process as well. 102 Patient advocacy groups are seeking access to the Medicare
database that contains detailed billing information from thousands of providers in order to
publish performance evaluations of those physicians. 103
In my view, the best way to view these developments in informed consent law is through a
risk-governance lens that forces us to focus on how the state, the private market, and the
profession are all operating in a system for the allocation and management of clinical and
financial risk.
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One can argue that using a risk-governance approach to health law will render the field
less distinctive, thus threatening whatever sense of intellectual coherence it can still muster.
However, only the traditional professional-autonomy model proffers a claim for the uniqueness
of health law. The others, like the risk-governance paradigm, focus on doctrines that have
remained tailored to health care, but not unique to it. In my view, a risk-governance model is a
superior analytic tool because it provides us with more fully theorized and contemporarily
relevant insights into the operations of the health care system.
Another advantage of the risk-governance paradigm is that it can significantly bridge the
gap between the traditionally private law of health care financing and delivery and the
traditionally public law of the public health system. Public health principles are founded on an
orientation to population health, rather than individual patient care. 104 The law governing the
doctor-patient relationship, by contrast, is about individual patient care. But both “bedside
rationing” by doctors dealing with the merger of financial and clinical risk and the allocation of
public dollars for population health increasingly turn on broad distributive questions. Mapping
the dynamics of financial risk in both systems can offer the possibility of greater coherence
between the two.
The same potential for transcending conceptual boundaries lies in bringing a riskgovernance approach to comparative health law. The American health care system is often
characterized in ways that highlight its singularity, particularly in its financing mechanisms and
its under-inclusiveness. 105 Yet, multiple national systems are grappling with how to meld
processes for coverage determinations with quantitative models for budgeting and risk
assessment. 106 Whatever the differences in the structures of various national systems, American
and other health officials are encountering many of the same cross-cutting issues related to
financial management—a shared concern best highlighted by a risk-governance approach.
B. THE COLONIZATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY RISK GOVERNANCE

The new patterns of risk assumption within health care that I describe in the Introduction
have introduced instability into the legal concept of fiduciary duty. The colonization of fiduciary
duty by risk governance provides an example of how understanding health law through the lens
of risk governance can help bring clarity and coherence to doctrinal developments in the field.
A physician’s fiduciary duty to place the interests of her patients above all other concerns
has long been an article of faith within the medical profession. 107 Its origins lay in the
Hippocratic Oath’s injunction that physicians shall enter houses only for the benefit of the ill,
and not for personal gain, and it is reflected today also in the Declaration of Geneva and the
ethics code of the British General Medical Council. 108 A fiduciary duty has also long been
present in tort and contract principles in traditional health law. 109
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But, in actuarial medicine today, a physician’s fiduciary duty has essentially been ERISAfied. ERISA is the statute that effectively regulates private sector health insurance. 110 ERISA
does not explicitly dictate that a treating physician should interpret her fiduciary duty in a
managed care setting differently than she did in a fee-for-service system. The judicial
interpretation of the responsibility established by ERISA for both the sponsor and the insurer of a
group plan have in effect trumped the purely medical concept of fiduciary duty 111—hence
resulting in what I call the colonization of fiduciary duty by risk governance.
ERISA establishes fiduciary responsibilities for the persons or entities charged with the
oversight and administration of an employee benefit plan. 112 The ERISA fiduciary concept draws
primarily on the principle from trust law that a trustee has a duty of loyalty to administer a trust
solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 113 Trust fiduciary duty attaches to the fund itself, and
requires that the trustee exercise prudence in approving and rejecting any claims made on the
fund. 114 The trustee’s duty is to manage the fund in such a way that all of the beneficiaries will
be able to share its benefits, not to direct that each beneficiary will necessarily receive the
maximum she seeks from the trust. 115
The primary motivation for ERISA was to provide new rules for the solvency, disclosure
policies, vesting rules, and administration of pension plans. 116 In this context, the traditional duty
of a trust fiduciary works relatively well. But because ERISA regulates “welfare” plans
generally, it also governs plans providing health benefits. 117 In this context, the fiduciary
relationship has become more complicated. As noted above, health care providers often manage
both clinical and financial risk in an integrated fashion, and employers sponsoring health care
plans want dual, sometime contradictory goals—to provide health care benefits to their
employees but also to control costs through managed care frameworks.
The result is a health law doctrine created by the Supreme Court that accommodates the
realities of these merged identities on the part of providers and these dueling interests on the part
(last visited May 25, 2008); General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (2006), http://www.gmcuk.org/guidance/good_medical_practice/duties_of_a_doctor.asp (“Make the care of your patient your first concern”)
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109
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Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 349 n.211
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of employers. Two cases decided within four years of each other demonstrate the twisting road
taken by the Supreme Court to accommodate risk-governance practices in health care.
In Pegram v. Herdich, 118 the Supreme Court faced a complex situation involving a
defendant doctor who co-owned the HMO where she also worked as a treating physician. The
doctor, Lori Pegram, found an inflamed mass in Cynthia Herdrich’s abdomen. Despite the
inflammation, Pegram chose not to order an ultrasound for Herdrich at a local hospital, but
concluded instead that Herdrich could wait eight days for an ultrasound to be performed at a
facility staffed by the HMO itself, fifty miles away. Before the eight days were over, Herdrich’s
appendix ruptured, causing peritonitis. 119
Herdrich sued Pegram and the HMO for medical malpractice and state law fraud. 120 Pegram
and the HMO responded by arguing that ERISA preempted those claims and removed the case to
federal court. Herdrich then asserted her own ERISA claim by arguing that Pegram and the
HMO violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Her theory was that the terms of the HMO
rewarded its physician owners for limiting medical care, and thus “created an incentive to make
decisions in the physicians’ self-interest, rather than the exclusive interests of plan
participants.” 121
The sole legal question before the Supreme Court was “whether treatment decisions made
by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts
within the meaning of [ERISA.]” 122 The Court concluded they were not. 123
The Court ruled that an HMO’s fiduciary duty under ERISA applied only to coverage
decisions regarding benefits to be provided under a plan. 124 By contrast, the Court declared that a
doctor’s decision to delay a diagnostic test in order for it to be performed by a facility affiliated
with the HMO was a “mixed treatment-eligibility decision” and that such decisions were not
covered under ERISA’s fiduciary duty. 125
The Court’s decision in Pegram reads like a policy treatise on health care. It explains in
depth the cost-benefit balancing process that occurs in health care today. The Court compared
118
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HMOs to other risk bearing entities, such as traditional insurers, 126 and stated that for any HMO
structure, “there must be rationing and inducement to ration.” 127 The Court observed that, under
the plaintiff’s theory, the mere existence of such a scheme would constitute a breach of ERISA
fiduciary duty and the ultimate result “would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit
HMO.” 128
Regarding physicians, the Court noted that “the incentive of the HMO physician . . . to give
treatment sparingly” cannot be easily overcome. 129 The Court hypothesized that were it to
recognize mixed treatment-eligibility decisions as covered by ERISA’s fiduciary duty
requirements, a physician’s obvious defense to a charge of violating such duty would be that the
decision had been justified by good medical reasons. 130 But this, the Court explained, would turn
ERISA fiduciary claims into simple malpractice disputes that would be resolved on the
malpractice standard of “reasonable and customary medical practice in like circumstances.” 131
Allowing such claims would be wasteful and unnecessary as simply duplicative of medical
malpractice claims. 132
What the Court achieved in this analytical move, albeit completely without
acknowledgement, was to signal the erasure of the medical fiduciary standard as an independent,
viable standard for physicians in managed care settings. Under a traditional medical fiduciary
standard, a physician makes treatment decisions based solely on the best interests of the
particular patient; she does not properly consider rationing concerns. 133 In its place, the Court
retained only the medical malpractice standard, which considers whether a physician’s treatment
decision is consistent with reasonable and customary medical practice standards. 134
The difference between the two standards is that a medical malpractice standard is not
intrinsically in conflict with a doctor’s concern about either her own income or cost-benefit
calculations as to an insurance fund. Under reasonable and customary medical practice standards
today, treating physicians could opt for the least expensive choice among what can reasonably be
expected to be equally effective regimens.
By contrast, the traditional medical fiduciary duty does conflict with this kind of cost-benefit
analysis or the favoring of personal gain. The net effect is that the trust concept as incorporated
in ERISA, under which a duty of stewardship attaches to a collective (insurance) fund, has
become the new version of medical fiduciary duty. 135
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This result may well constitute acceptable health policy. My point is not to contest or
analyze its utility as policy. Rather, it is simply to highlight how the Court’s legal conclusion
regarding fiduciary duty under ERISA was shaped by the reality of risk governance in health
care today. As reflected in and implicitly consolidated by the Court’s Pegram decision, the
medical fiduciary duty for physicians who practice in systems with financial incentives—now a
majority of American doctors—has changed in substance if not in semantics. That duty now
operates in tandem with, not as a prohibition on, concerns related to forms of financial risk that
could create a significant drain on an insurance fund and negatively affect the physician’s
income.
The Court implicitly reaffirmed the primacy of risk governance in shaping health law
doctrine in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila. 136 There, plaintiffs sued a MCO for denying approval of
various treatment recommendations that their physicians, who would be reimbursed by the
MCO, had made. 137 The plaintiffs sued the MCO under a Texas statute that created tort liability
for the failure to exercise “‘ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions.’” 138
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the MCO’s denials of authorization for assertedly medically
necessary services were “‘mixed eligibility and treatment decisions’” and hence, pursuant to
Pegram, were not fiduciary decisions covered by ERISA. 139 On that reasoning, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the state law claim was not preempted by ERISA and could proceed. 140
The Supreme Court reversed. 141 The Court explained that mixed treatment and eligibility
decisions fell outside the definition of coverage decisions governed by ERISA’s fiduciary duty
only when such decisions were made by the treating physician, as had occurred in Pegram. That
is, a decision about whether a treatment was medically necessary would be considered a medical
decision for purposes of liability only if made by a treating physician. When made by MCO
reviewing staff, as in Davila, such a decision would be treated as a coverage decision subject to
ERISA standards. 142
The Court’s reasoning made it clear that it did not consider the mixed decisions made by the
MCO reviewers to be any less medical in nature; they were clearly assessments of the medical
necessity of care needed for a specific individual with a particular condition. But in a highly
formalistic move, the Court concluded that the coverage function of the decision simply trumped
the medical nature of the decision, even though the effect of the coverage decision was to deny
care.
The logic of the Court’s analysis subordinated medical judgment to resource allocation. The
Court noted that “a trustee managing a medical trust undoubtedly must make administrative
decisions that require the exercise of medical judgment.” 143 The opinion in Davila frames
decisions about medical necessity as requiring no different process than that for decisions about
136
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pensions or vacation pay—other benefits governed by the ERISA structure. “[B]enefits
determinations involving medical judgments are, just as much as any other benefits
determinations, actions by plan fiduciaries.” 144 This includes “even determinations based
extensively on medical judgments.” 145 The Court’s reasoning creates a hierarchy of expertise, in
which medical knowledge is but one factor in the larger project of conserving fund assets.
To summarize, the Court’s dicta in Pegram accurately captures the “bedside rationing”
reality of today’s care, in which the medical fiduciary duty has melded with the ERISA standard
for fiduciary duty, leaving only the medical malpractice standard to police conduct. Pegram
normalized actuarial medicine by describing treatment decisions, correctly, as routinely
incorporating financial considerations. In Davila, the Court ruled that the law governing risk
distribution—that is, insurance law—preempted any other legal remedy for failure to act
reasonably in making the medical/coverage decision. In other words, the financial stability
concerns animating ERISA preemption trumped.
The important aspect of these decisions is not the particular doctrine they have generated
under ERISA. Rather, my purpose in examining these cases has been to demonstrate the
assumptions they reveal about the appropriate nature of medical practice and the dynamic
relationship between financial and clinical risk concerns in the health care system.
These decisions illustrate that the defining characteristic of health law is no longer
professional autonomy, but rather a tripartite structure of risk regulation that is often hidden by
its private contractual delegation to providers. Doctors act as insurers because they often are
insurers. The most powerfully explanatory blueprint of roles within the health care system today
reveals an architecture based on the assumption of financial risk.
III. THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE
In the Introduction of this Article, I made the claim for understanding risk governance as
dominating health care today, with the concomitant rise of actuarial medicine. In Part I of the
Article, I argued that conceptualizing health law as responding to and facilitating risk governance
in health care offers us the most coherent framework for understanding health law as a
meaningful field.
In this Part, I seek to demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the preemption
provisions of ERISA, the primary statute that directly channels private health insurance risk in
the United States, has been influenced by considerations of risk governance. In section A, I
explain the motivations for and development of ERISA, including the small governmental
regulatory role that the law originally anticipated. I then offer an historical reading of ERISA that
is largely absent from both judicial and scholarly treatments of the law—that ERISA’s policy
preference for a small governmental regulatory role was premised on the background knowledge
that joint labor-management sovereignty dominated the process for constructing health insurance
plans through collective bargaining agreements in various employment settings. As we now
know, the assumption that such a state of affairs would continue has proven not to be true, given
the sharp decrease in union membership levels.
In section B, I describe how the Supreme Court’s interpretations of ERISA’s explicit and
implicit preemption components have shifted the law’s initial model of joint labor-management
sovereignty to virtually complete management sovereignty—what I term “corporate federalism”
144
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in private health insurance. I explain how this shift can be best understood using the lens of riskgovernance analysis.
Finally, in section C, I defend the original concept behind Congress’ decision to devolve
power to the workplace level through ERISA’s structure. Contrary to the dominant view in
scholarly analysis of ERISA’s preemption doctrine, I argue that future health care reform efforts
should leave such preemption in place. In doing so, I offer a partial defense of workplace
federalism. These arguments establish the foundation for my normative proposal, in Part IV, in
which I call for democracy-enhancing governance reforms in workplace risk pools for so long as
health insurance is tied to employment. My proposal in Part IV could be revised to achieve the
same goal of deliberative democracy in health care were the United States to shift away from
employer-sponsored plans and towards a single-payer system.
A. ERISA: THE PREQUEL

In 1946, six years before the steel mill seizure that triggered the constitutional crisis
resolved in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 146 President Truman seized the coal mines
to prevent a national strike over health insurance benefits. 147 During the postwar period, worker
demand for health insurance coverage, which had abated during a wartime no-strike pledge by
unions, surged back to the forefront of domestic issues. 148 Campaigns for health coverage that
had been preserved, or sometimes expanded, by governmental action during the war 149 spread
rapidly through the economy when the war ended. 150
The ideological drive to incorporate health insurance into the workplace harmonized with
the “industrial self-government” paradigm that dominated labor law at the time. 151 Under this
paradigm, workplaces were viewed as highly self-contained, largely independent zones, with
powers analogous to those of sovereign entities. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was
viewed by sympathetic courts and agency officials as the constitution for the workplace: within
the terms set by federal labor statutes, unions and management would negotiate a mutually
146
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agreed upon charter for the governance of their world of employment. 152 The infrastructure and
rules of arbitration created by the CBAs substituted for the infrastructure and rules of the
judiciary that existed in the parallel traditional governmental state. 153
Under this industrial self-government paradigm, balancing the trade-offs between who
would have access to health care and how the costs of such care would be covered fell within the
scope of labor-management negotiation. The results of those negotiations were then filtered
through private insurance markets. In line with the concept of the workplace as a parallel quasigovernment, unions initially framed the cost of health benefits as a form of a “tax” to be paid by
employers. 154 As Paul Starr has noted, this metaphor provided the basis for persuading Congress
to enact a tax exemption in 1954 for employer contributions to health insurance, on the argument
that treating such contributions as taxable income would amount to “double taxation” on the
employer. 155 The tax exemption for employee health benefits thus not only created a fiscal
incentive for employers to offer health insurance plan to employees, thus tethering health
insurance to the workplace, but it also implicitly acknowledged how deeply the concept of
workplace self-government was built into federal law.
By the 1950s, the extent to which “fringe” benefits, such as health insurance, had gained
in importance compared to wages amounted to “something close to a revolution” for industrial
relations. 156 Unions and employers fought over who would sponsor the health insurance plans.
Employers saw advantages in seizing “the moral high ground” by initiating insurance benefits. 157
When the United Auto Workers (UAW) sought a jointly-controlled health benefits plan in 1947,
General Motors refused on the ground that health insurance should be considered solely a
management prerogative. 158
Regardless of who sponsored the health plans, many union leaders believed that providing
such plans for workers was advantageous for unions because it created a powerful bond between
a union and its members. This was either because the union sponsored the plan itself (as several
unions did) 159 or because the union would get credit for securing the benefit for its members
from the employer. 160 In 1957, twenty-five percent of employees with health insurance were
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enrolled in a plan over which their union exercised some degree of control. 161 As a result, union
political support for a government-centered, national health coverage system diminished. 162
Tensions arose between management and labor with regard to whether an employersponsored plan had a duty to share fiscal information with the union. 163 In addition, instances of
financial abuses by both labor and management of increasingly hefty health insurance and
pension funds arose. 164 Congress responded with the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
in 1958. 165 As even greater portions of overall employee compensation continued to pour into
benefits, however, political demands grew for a more systematic and thorough policing of the
funds. 166
The capstone to this reform movement was the enactment of ERISA. 167 ERISA was very
much a product of its time, considered to be an enormous political victory on behalf of ordinary
workers, in sync with the major civil rights statutes of the 1960s. 168 Labor unions joined with
business interests to support its enactment, largely because of the strength of their shared desire
to avoid state regulation. 169 According to James Wooten, the effect was so profound that
“preemption issues created the coalition that pushed ERISA through Congress.” 170
Unfortunately, the law was founded on three assumptions that all evaporated within a
decade. First, unionism was still a viable movement in 1974; the sharp plummet in union
membership occurred in the 1980s, 171 and today has reached a low-water mark of 7.4% of
private industry workers. 172 Second, health care costs were still relatively modest in 1974; the
upward spike of medical sector inflation was imminent, but had not yet occurred. 173 Third,
dramatic scenes that carried the message that “the union would take care of its own.” KLEIN, supra note 148, at 197–
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contingent on the first two, it was still plausible in 1974 to imagine that non-union employers
would compete for labor by seeking to match the health insurance benefits negotiated by unions,
so that the overall trend would be a ratcheting-up of health benefits for all employees. 174
As we now well know, global labor competition soon turned the tables, so that massively
expensive health benefits have become the albatross of employers. 175 Health insurance terms of
coverage have become a frequent source of give-backs in labor negotiations, 176 employer
sponsorship of health insurance plans has decreased rather than increased, 177 and, in a deeply
ironic twist on history, GM has offloaded a portion of its health insurance benefits obligation to
the UAW. 178
Supreme Court decisions interpreting provisions of ERISA premised on these assumptions
have been blind to how those assumptions have changed. The Court has rigidly adhered to
provisions that were based on principles intended to insulate collective bargaining from state
regulation, which made sense in light of the prevailing paradigm of industrial self-regulation,
without any acknowledgment that collective bargaining itself had largely disappeared. Scholars,
too, have overlooked the dramatic changes in workplace governance in critiques of how the
courts have interpreted ERISA.
Understanding ERISA’s origin in an era of widespread industrial self-government is crucial
to an analysis not only of how this system of health insurance law now operates as a technology
of governance, but also of its potential for democratic reform. But before addressing that
potential, we need to recognize how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA’s preemption
provision has created a system of corporate federalism in health care.
B. THE INVENTION OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM

According to Justice Kennedy, one of the Framers’ greatest contributions to American law
was to “split the atom of sovereignty” by recognizing the dual realms of state and national
government. 179 More modestly, the convergence of ERISA’s statutory text, its judicial
interpretation, and financial pressure from inflation in the medical sector of the economy has
produced a triple atomic split for governance of the health care insurance system, with the new
offshoot being corporate sovereignty.
In this section, I analyze ERISA along the dimensions of federalism. I argue that ERISA is
best understood as creating a triple sovereignty of federal, state, and corporate power for the
174
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governance of private health insurance. Under this structure, employers have gained authority to
allocate health care risk through the control of decisions about which employees they will cover
(pooling) and what benefits they will provide (rationing). 180
This triple sovereignty is the result of the interpretation of ERISA by the judicial branch in a
manner that blocks most state law regulation and by the subsequent lack of response by the
federal political branch in a failure to amend ERISA. Although commentary regularly refers to
the result of the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemption doctrine as a “regulatory vacuum,” 181 a
vacuum exists only if one limits one’s view of regulation to purely governmental actions. If one
understands private mechanisms to operate as part of governance, the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence appears less as a vacuum than as a delegation, specifically the delegation of
effective regulatory power to employers.
A fundamental reality of the American health system is its voluntary baseline: employers
may choose to offer health insurance, but they are not required to do so. If an employer decides
to offer health insurance, ERISA establishes the framework for decisions made by employers
along two dimensions of risk: the composition of risk pools (pooling) and the authorization to
determine the scope of coverage (rationing).
The ERISA framework empowers employers. Employers determine who is covered, how,
and what the parameters of coverage will be. 182 Employers also establish the mechanisms for
deciding disputes over whether particular benefits are covered within the terms of the plan. 183
These issues of who is covered, for what, who gets to decide disputes that arise concerning those
terms, and what the potential penalties are for wrongful denials of coverage set the boundaries of
financial risk for the plan’s sponsor.
One can imagine a legal system in which employers would generally make these decisions,
but within constraints established by state law, either general laws (e.g., tort or contract laws) or
laws specific to health care regulation. But that is not the model for employers today. ERISA
occupies the field for private sector workplace health insurance plans because of and through its
preemption provisions. 184
1. The ERISA Accordion of “Relates to” Preemption
A three-set process that I call the “ERISA accordion” sets the bounds of ERISA’s explicit
“relates to” preemption clause. The three steps are found in section 514 of the statute, which
begins by providing that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 185 If one imagines an accordion spread
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wide, the apparent meaning of the phrase “relate to any employee benefit plan” would seem to
encompass an enormous range of state laws that would be preempted by ERISA.
The broad scope of the “relates to” provision is curtailed, however, by what has been called
the “savings clause.” This is the second step that pulls the accordion in a bit. Also part of section
514, the savings clause provides that the “relates to” provision “shall [not] be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any [State law] which regulates insurance . . .” 186 The savings
clause thus contracts the preemptive power of ERISA to fit only the space not occupied by state
laws which regulate insurance. Since enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, 187
regulation of insurance has been left almost entirely to state government. 188 The savings clause
preserves this allocation of authority to the states.
In the third step, the accordion widens again to reinstate preemption for certain entities.
Under what is called the “deemer clause,” no employer benefit plan (EBP) that is self-insured
“shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the
business of insurance . . . for purposes of any [State law] purporting to regulate insurance
companies [or] insurance contracts . . .” 189
Self-insured plans, therefore, enjoy the full benefits of ERISA preemption. In self-insured
plans, employers fund the plans without purchasing insurance against the risk of claim costs
exceeding the available funds that have been set aside by the employer for paying benefits under
the program. 190 Insurance companies handle only the administrative aspects of processing claims
in self-insured plans. If an EBP is self-insured, deference to traditional state authority to regulate
insurance will not apply. 191
The movements of an accordion illustrate how the three steps relate to each other. But they
tell us nothing about how wide or narrow each playing position will be. When litigation testing
the ERISA preemption clause began, therefore, the Supreme Court had to pick its way—with
little legislative guidance—through questions such as whether “relates to” should be given its
broadest construction 192 or whether a state law had to specifically mention or allude to EBPs in
order to trigger “relates to” preemption. 193 Similarly, even if “relates to” had a wide sweep, its
impact would be significantly diminished if the Court accorded similar breadth to the category of
state laws that “regulate insurance,” whether directly or indirectly, whether statutorily or by
common law principles. 194 The Court thus acquired the authority, through its interpretation of
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ERISA, to determine how much power the states would have to set the terms of private
employment health insurance policy in America.
2. Remedies Preemption
Section 502 of ERISA sets forth the remedies available to enrollees in employee benefit
plans who assert that they have been wrongfully denied a benefit due to them under the plan.
This section provides exclusive federal court jurisdiction for actions brought under ERISA, and
allows plaintiffs to “recover benefits due,” enjoin violations of the statute or of the plan, seek
attorney’s fees and costs, and “obtain other appropriate equitable relief.” 195 The relief provided
for in section 502 does not include any consequential or non-economic damages for the denial of
a benefit under the plan. There is also no provision in the remedies section of ERISA that
explicitly preempts other state-law remedies that could be used for conduct that violates ERISA.
Through case law, however, the Supreme Court has created a remedies preemption in
ERISA that is separate and distinct from the law’s explicit accordion preemption provision. The
Court has inferred remedies preemption largely from a House-Senate Conference Report on
ERISA. 196 The Conference Report states that suits to enforce benefit rights under ERISA are to
be regarded solely as federal question claims, in the same way as suits asserting violations of the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement are viewed as federal question claims that are
preempted by section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 197 The catalyst for this
statement appears to have been vigorous lobbying by representatives of organized labor, who
sought to preserve the terms of their CBAs, including the establishment of arbitration panels for
disputes arising under the CBA, from encroachment by state regulation. 198
In using ERISA’s legislative history to infer an implied preemption of state law remedies for
the denial of benefits under an ERISA governed plan, however, the Supreme Court never
questioned the appropriateness of transplanting a preemption doctrine from a statute designed to
protect the ability of unions and management to conclusively settle questions concerning the
workplace into a legal context in which there was no counterweight to management power.
Instead, the Court silently rewrote a provision designed to privilege collective bargaining
agreements into a bar against seeking damages through state law, even for bad faith violations of
one-sided contracts.
3. The Evolution of ERISA’s Two Forms of Preemption
The dynamics behind ERISA preemption have shifted in opposite directions for the two
forms of preemption under ERISA. In its early cases interpreting section 514, the Court reliably
invalidated state laws by a literal and expansive reading of the phrase “relates to.” Since 1995,
however, the Court has changed the ground rules for section 514 preemption, finding that the
preemption inquiry should begin with a presumption in favor of state laws regulating health
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care. 199 In addition to retracting the scope of “relates to,” the Court has also expanded the scope
of the second step in the accordion—the insurance savings clause. 200
During the same period, however, the Court has refused to budge from its broad
application of remedies preemption, leading to the paradox that the implicit form of preemption
under ERISA is now more powerful than the statute’s explicit preemption command. This has
not resulted from a commitment to hyper-textualism or an antipathy to legislative purposes.
Rather, I argue that the Court has become increasingly tied to ERISA’s purpose as it relates to
risk governance. One particularly important actor that has influenced the Court to place
sensitivity to financial risk allocation policy at the heart of its ERISA jurisprudence has been the
Office of the Solicitor General.
The literalism in readings of ERISA’s accordion preemption began in 1983 with the first
ERISA preemption case concerning health benefits to reach the Supreme Court: Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. 201 Shaw involved a New York anti-discrimination statute that required employers
to treat pregnancy the same as other health conditions. 202 Among the policies affected by the
New York state law were health benefits plans covered by ERISA. In ruling on whether the New
York statute fell under the first step of the ERISA accordion as a “State law . . . [that] may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan,” 203 the Court relied on the “breadth . . . apparent
from [the] language” of section 514’s preemption clause. 204 The Court found that “the normal
sense of the phrase” meant that a law related to an ERISA plan “if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan.” 205
The brief filed by the Solicitor General’s office in Shaw influenced the Court’s analysis of
Congressional intent with regard to ERISA. The Court identified Congress’s desire to
accommodate an employer’s interest in avoiding “conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation of [EBPs]” as a major part of the purpose behind ERISA. 206 The Solicitor General’s
brief stressed that goal, twice driving home the point that shielding employers from variances in
state laws was intended by Congress “to foster the development of benefits plans.” 207
The Solicitor General’s brief framed ERISA itself in negative terms, as a law placing
significant burdens on employers, and suggested that broad preemption was the compensation
for such burdens: “Sensitive to the fact that the private benefit plan system is voluntary on the
part of employers, Congress determined to lessen the disruptive effect of the new federal law by
199
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saving plans from possibly inconsistent or duplicative state laws.” 208 The Solicitor General thus
implicitly warned the Court that if it did not interpret ERISA in a way that could allow large
employers to achieve cost savings from single administrative systems, it might increase the
number of uninsured by driving employers away from voluntarily sponsoring any health benefit
plans. 209
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 210 a case before the Court two years after Shaw,
the need to encourage employers to offer voluntary plans again came to the fore. In Pilot Life, an
insurance company asserted that ERISA preempted a Mississippi common law right of action for
bad faith denial of claims. The beneficiary of the plan had sued Pilot Life, the insurance
company, in state court for damages from repeated denials and delays in the payment of a claim
that the insurer had ultimately accepted. 211 During oral argument, after an extended colloquy
with the Justices about whether an insured “could get [any] money” if an insurer persisted in
stonewalling on payment, 212 counsel for Pilot Life pressed a point raised by Justice White: that
large punitive damages awards “would also raise insurance premiums substantially.” 213 Although
there was no legislative history on this precise point, counsel reasoned that “in ERISA Congress
had that concern . . . these plans are voluntary, nobody has to set them up. This is a law to
provide for a voluntary system that companies will take on individually. So it was intended to be
run efficiently and effectively, and at low cost.” 214
The Court in Pilot Life recognized, for the first time, that ERISA’s system of remedies
created its own powerful force for preemption without an explicit textual base. 215 The source for
this new doctrine, which became an independent basis for preemption, 216 was the amicus brief
filed by then Solicitor General Charles Fried. 217 The Court concluded that the remedial scheme
that Congress had adopted in ERISA “represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and
fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of
employee benefit plans.” 218 This language frames the interests as those of individual enrollees
versus the broader need to entice employers to offer benefits. All intimations of employee
collective bargaining or industrial self-government were gone.
By the time Pegram v. Herdrich reached the Court thirteen years later, 219 the Justices had
developed a very clear-eyed focus on the relationship between potential liability for employers
through litigation and how the health care system’s structure was carefully balanced on a
foundation of risk allocation. At the core of the Pegram opinion is an understanding of ERISA
not simply as a specification of certain rights and duties, but as a charter under which employers
voluntarily undertake the responsibility for providing health insurance coverage to the bulk of
the U.S. population in return for the state ceding control to such employers of all determinants of
208
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risk in the health care setting. 220 Two years later, in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, the
Court described ERISA policy as “inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable
set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate
remedial orders and awards.” 221
The existence of ERISA’s deemer clause, the third step of the ERISA accordion, supports
the inference that Congress intended to protect discretionary management of risk. The deemer
clause of the ERISA accordion explicitly treats some workplace plans differently. If a plan selfinsures, that is, if it assumes the risk itself without purchasing full insurance coverage for that
risk, that plan receives a pass on even having to contest whether a state law regulates insurance.
The second step of the accordion—exempting from preemption state laws that “regulate
insurance”—simply does not apply to self-insured plans. 222 In effect, the greater the risk
assumed by the sponsor of a plan, the stronger the sovereignty principle that will attach to the
plan.
On the surface, it may be hard to discern a policy rationale for creating a tier of legal
deference for employers depending on how they have chosen to structure their health benefit
plans. 223 The deemer clause has the effect of exempting an entity from insurance regulation not
because it is not really engaged in insurance practices (and for that reason should not fall within
the scope of state laws regulating insurance), but because risk underwriting and spreading is
precisely what it is engaged in. The only logical basis for making such a distinction between
employer benefit plans (EBPs) that will remain subject to state laws regulating insurance, and
those that will gain the benefit of complete preemption, is the goal of facilitating corporate
governance organized around allocation of risk.
Contrary to some other scholars, I do not believe that one can attribute the Supreme
Court’s solicitude for protecting EBP sponsors from bothersome state regulation simply to an
inclination by the Court to favor a corporate desire to lower costs and preserve profit levels. The
Supreme Court has ruled that increased expenses directly caused by state rate-setting laws will
not justify the “relates to” preemption; 224 and that benefits expensed from general company
assets (such as vacation pay) rather than from an insurance fund cannot be considered part of an
EBP under ERISA. 225 Mere cost reduction associated with employee benefits has not been
enough to cause the Court to defer to management decisions.
Rather it is the unpredictability of potential damages, especially punitive damages, that
distinguishes the function of the implied but more powerful remedies preemption doctrine from
the explicit guidance for preemption found in section 514. Indeed, the fears associated with out-
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of-control punitive damages have spawned a new branch of due process jurisprudence. 226 Capital
markets in the managed care industry also overreact to risk associated with litigation. 227 What
seems essential in the ERISA health benefit cases is the Court’s apparent belief that too much
judicial tinkering could lead not simply to increases in corporate costs, but rather to the danger
that a health insurance/care system based on voluntary actions by employers could crater and
crash.
In a steadily developing line of cases, the Court has shifted its framing and analysis of
ERISA from a law designed to serve as a protective mechanism against sponsor abuse of
employee benefits into a law that operates as a shield for plan sponsors against unpredictable
financial risk. The greater receptivity to big business demands occurred during long stretches of
Republican control of Congress and of the Executive Branch, which brought an unsurprising
conservatization of the federal judiciary. But such receptivity continued largely without
interruption during the Clinton Administration as well, 228 and has been reflected in mostly
unanimous decisions by the Supreme Court. 229 The Supreme Court’s sub silentio policymaking
has also been implicitly ratified by the absence of major alterations to ERISA by either of the
political branches of the federal government. 230
Today, after dozens of decisions, there is no mystery about the division of power. Bluntly
put, the regulatory power of states over health care policy involving workplace health insurance
exists only when it is least likely to infringe on an employer’s discretion to control and predict
financial risk. 231 Through its interpretation of ERISA, the Court has developed a distinctive twist
on federalism, sharply contrasting with its approach to Tenth Amendment cases and other
situations involving conflicts between federal and state power. 232 Using ERISA federalism, the
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Court has delegated the lion’s share of health risk-governance policymaking to private
employers.
C. A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF WORKPLACE FEDERALISM

At this point in the argument, many critics of ERISA preemption doctrine for health
insurance benefits (and there are virtually no defenders in the academy) argue for repealing or
weakening the law’s preemptive impact. 233 I disagree. There are significant costs to the current
system of employer-based health insurance and the ERISA preemption that shields such
insurance from state regulation. 234 I see no need to rehearse those well-developed arguments
here. My claim, simply, is that critics of ERISA preemption have failed to explore and consider
possible legitimate interests that might be served by strong preemption in the federal law,
interests that might ultimately prove useful in achieving better equity in the current system.
In this section, therefore, I offer a partial defense of the system of the triple sovereignty (but
without granting all prerogatives to management) that ERISA preemption has established. My
argument is that it is worthwhile to illuminate progressive interests that might be served by
workplace federalism. Such interests might then be leveraged in a manner that achieves more
equitable results if the democracy deficit in workplace risk-pool governance could be adequately
addressed, a challenge I take up in the next section.
In the context of health insurance, I theorize corporate entities as resembling a functional
hybrid of national and state governments, comprising some of the benefits of each. For example,
allowing an employer with workers in multiple states to avoid conflicting state regulations
permits that organization to capture the benefits of a national market and facilitates rational
large-scale planning. In the traditional terms of the federalist debate, this is similar to the
Hamiltonian notion of nation-building and the facilitation of a single market provided by a strong
national government. 235
At the same time, the multiplicity of employers also serves some of the functions of the
multiple states, a la Jeffersonian local autonomy and decentralized democracy. Although each
organization engages in central planning, there is no one omnipotent planning source for all
employers. This degree of decentralization guards against the establishment of a single uniform
workplace benefits structure that might leave employees without any power, through exit and
mobility, to seek a job with a different set of benefits. 236
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51–53 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
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233
See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow the States to
Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 1023–25 (2000); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign
States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 543–52 (1993); James E. Holloway, Revisiting Cooperative Federalism in Mandated
Employer-Sponsored Health Care Programs Under the ERISA Preemption Provision, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J.
239, 286–87 (2005); Edward A. Zelinsky, Travelers, Reasoned Textualism, and the New Jurisprudence of ERISA
Preemption, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 863–70 (1999).
234
See Richard Briffault & Sherry Glied, Federalism and the Future of Health Care Reform, in THE PRIVATIZATION
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 49, 65–71 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).
235
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
236
The common interests of an employer and employees in strong corporate sovereignty, at least in unionized
workplaces where there is not a democracy deficit, was strikingly evident during oral argument in Metropolitan Life
Insurance, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), a case in which both employers and unions joined in challenging a Massachusetts
Page 35 of 50

Corporate sovereignty thus mimics the advantages associated with the powers of states in a
system of federalism. And the disadvantages of strong corporate sovereignty are similar to the
disadvantages of state governments that are too strong in a system of federalism. If federal law
exempts many EBPs from regulation centered in the geopolitical jurisdiction in which particular
groups of workers live, that permits employers to trigger significant negative externalities for
that locale. For example, if employers in a state can control, without any constraints by state
regulation, which employees are admitted to an employer’s risk pool (e.g., full time workers, but
not part time workers) and what benefits individuals admitted to the risk pool will receive (e.g.,
physician coverage but not mental health coverage), that will necessarily leave a number of
individuals outside of workplace plans or without access to certain benefits. The costs of that
imbalance will be borne by state and federal taxpayers through increased costs in Medicaid and
state public hospitals and emergency centers. 237
And, continuing the metaphor, just as in federalism debates about governmental
jurisdictions, an argument in favor of employer independence, even in light of resulting
externalities, is that such independence is the price of innovation. Allowing political space for
variation enables laboratories of experimentation to exist. And corporate entities today do, in
fact, function as laboratories in the development of health policy, not only with regard to health
insurance coverage, but also with regard to delivery of health services and quality
improvement. 238
Of course, the corporate-state analogy is imperfect. Obviously employers are not subject to
the direct democratic control that, however incompletely, exists in states. From the citizenworker’s perspective, however, social relations may produce a simulacrum of collectivity. A
sense of community attaches to the workplace as well as to political jurisdictions. Co-workers
law that required all health insurance plans in the state to include coverage for mental health coverage. In that case,
counsel for plaintiffs argued that:
[J]ust as there is no such thing as a free lunch, there is no such thing as a free benefit. The
mandated benefit has to be paid for. So, to offset the additional expense you either have to reduce
wages or you have to sacrifice a benefit that you want for a benefit that you don't want . . . . One
union had to give up dental benefits and eyeglass benefits that they very badly wanted and had to
increase eligibility requirements in order to get mental health benefits about which they were less
concerned [but which had been mandated by the State].
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (No. 84-325). When Justice
Rehnquist probed why the state’s policy forcing these kinds of trade-offs should not be enforced, counsel responded:
Because Congress made it quite clear that it wanted the benefit package to be a matter of private
choice. To take an example, a coal miner has different health priorities, different needs, different
desires than an airplane pilot would have. And, Congress very clearly left that part to private
regulation.
Id. at 7.
See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2007). These externalized costs
are the primary reason states struggle against ERISA preemption, as they seek to regulate access and cost in ways
that can encompass persons in private employment-based insurance.
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share an affiliative identity based on their employment, which may be experienced as
comparable in strength to their felt affiliation with their state of residence. Even without
collective bargaining in the workplace, this sense of community can translate into a willingness
to exert pressure in efforts to alter management decisions regarding benefits. In short, even if one
disagrees with the comparison, an ERISA jurisprudence that treats corporate health insurance
plan sponsors in ways analogous to how states are treated in traditional federalism is not
irrational along either legal or cultural dimensions. 239
The free rein given to employers by ERISA’s strong pre-emptive power provides
independence to employers for crafting risk-governance approaches, including making decisions
that affect the delivery of health services and quality improvement. Health policy writ small is
thus effectively being enacted in localized laboratories of workplaces throughout the country.
The question I want to turn to is the following: if these local laboratories were infused with
democratic processes, could this corporate power be leveraged in a manner that would achieve
more equitable results—both on a local and a national level?
IV. THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN HEALTH CARE
In the current state of health insurance governance writ large, the American public lacks any
significant input into the politics of risk distribution. There is no structure today that
meaningfully engages citizens in grappling with questions of access and cost in health care. As a
result, democratic engagement with health policy lacks both depth and a mechanism for active
participation.
There are several recent examples of the American electorate engaging with health care
issues. Among these have been the public’s demand for health care reform fueled by insecurity
about access to coverage; 240 the longstanding aversion to what voters believe amounts to
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“socialized medicine” 241; and the populist backlash against managed care entities and insurers in
the 1990s. 242
But the public’s engagement with health policy tends to be episodic and its understandings
shallow. For example, the widespread populist backlash against the most stringent managedcare-cost-control mechanisms led to a surge of state legislation in the late 1990’s. 243 This
backlash is probably best understood as a compound phenomenon. It is extremely difficult to
tease apart the multiple claims that fueled these initiatives: a demand for patient subjectivity
against the culture of impersonal treatment by physicians who were strangers; a demand for
accountability against the abuses of some MCOs in denying appropriate treatment because of
cost; and a demand by physicians for reinstatement of some measure of their traditional
authority.
Health care politics is misleading in its apparent accessibility. Virtually everyone
experiences the health care system, either directly as a patient or indirectly through a friend or
family member, and therefore has views about how the system can be improved. As a result,
there is a great breadth of public opinion about health care. Politically, these reactions can
translate into votes for a candidate whose views seem to mirror one’s own.
The actual quality of public knowledge at the policy level, however, is low. 244 Part of what
the public lacks is depth of knowledge. The system’s underlying structures of financial risk
allocation, embodied in such provisions as ERISA and tax law, are complex and not well known
or understood. The result is that policy decisions are delegated to holders of specialized
knowledge, and are effectively hidden from the public, even if they are hidden in plain sight.
The participatory dimension of the public’s relation to health care policy is also largely
missing. 245 Limits on public understanding and knowledge are exacerbated by limits on
mechanisms by which members of the public can participate effectively in health care system
governance. Although individuals are increasingly empowered as patients, particularly through
their use of the web to retrieve information about symptoms and treatment, the idea that serious
public engagement with health care system governance is a viable concept seldom surfaces in
public consciousness. As a result, there is a huge democracy deficit in health care system
governance today.
In this Part, I offer a normative argument for enhancing democratic engagement in health
care system governance and a proposal for doing so grounded in the pragmatic spirit of
241
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democratic experimentalism. 246 I argue that beyond the identities of patient and consumer,
individuals can and should assume the role and identity of citizen in the health care system.
Because governance encompasses more than just actions by the state, I believe that we should
seek to develop a meaningful concept of health care system citizenship and apply it to private
sector institutions as well as to government. Drawing on insights from new governance theory, I
argue that workplace-based risk pools have the potential to function not merely as actuarial
groupings, but as political entities as well.
In section A, I frame my argument for health care system citizenship as harmonious with the
concept of a “public” developed by Jurgen Habermas. I argue that such a public can develop a
knowledge base and body of experience with practical governance issues at a localized level.
Cumulatively and over time, the emergence of this public might then reshape the dynamics of
health care system policymaking on a broader, governmental level.
In section B, I argue that policymakers should study the possibility that risk pools associated
with employment-based health insurance would provide the best platform for building new
institutions of health care system citizenship. Because of the dense social connections that
characterize most workplaces, the employment setting offers what is perhaps a unique
environment for creating democracy-enhancing governance processes that can operate among
members of a risk pool. In addition, because the legal structure created by ERISA already shifts
significant control over pooling and rationing decisions to employer sponsors of health care, this
approach could leverage that structure in a progressive normative direction by enhancing the
worker voice in those decisions.
To be clear: I share the concerns of many regarding the negative policy implications of
tethering health insurance to the workplace. 247 Indeed, I believe an optimal health care system
would function as a universal, national plan. 248 However, I also believe that the practical politics
of our day dictate that employer-based health insurance will continue as a dominant force of our
health care system for some time to come. In light of that reality, I offer the following normative
argument and proposal for enhancing democratic engagement in health care system governance.
A. BUILDING NEW PUBLICS FOR HEALTH POLICY

One way to begin addressing the problem of Americans’ shallow engagement with health
policy issues is to conceptualize such debates as occurring within a “public,” using the analytic
structure developed by Jurgen Habermas. In Habermas’s work, the concept of a “public” denotes
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a cultural and social space, not a physical space, for dialogue about shared concerns. 249 Central
to Habermas’s thinking is the claim that the quality of society depends on the quality of our
dialogic engagement on important issues. 250 The quality of that engagement, in turn, depends on
whether the procedures for engagement reflect core ethical concerns such as equality of
participation. 251
Because democracy is not possible without meaningful participation, we advance
democratic norms in the governance of any system when we enhance the capacity of citizens to
debate and discuss substantive issues and to participate in their resolution. If one sees the health
care system as centered on risk managerialism, the central issue for enriching the democratic
characteristics of such a system becomes how to empower citizens to participate more effectively
in the politics of risk allocation and distribution.
My suggestion, therefore, is that we consider using risk pools as a venue for building publics
in the Habermasian sense. Conceptually, a risk pool is the local organizational and governance
unit of any insurance plan. However, it is seldom thought of in terms of self-governance. Risk
pools are actuarial constructs. They exist as clusters of individuals whose characteristics cause
them to fall within some category of risk relevant to the form of insurance being sold (e.g., the
risk pool of teenage drivers or of beachfront property owners). These are groups that generally
lack social meaning for their members; governance of the group is subsumed, without much
attention paid by its members, in an organization’s financial management or simply into an
insurer’s classification system. 252
But the risk pools on which group health insurance plans are based are different. I explore
those differences in more detail in the following section. But my core argument is that such risk
pools have the capacity to function also as publics. Acting locally, a risk-pool governance group
could engage the basic questions such as who and what should be covered in a particular context,
how to manage cost concerns, and what process should be used for resolving the inevitable
disputes over coverage that will arise.
How much decisionmaking power a risk-pool governance group might hold is a separate
question and is one that I outline below. The point I wish to make here is simply that creating a
process by which such questions would be debated, and by which input would be solicited, could
generate a new kind of health policy public: groups of health care system citizenry that are
deliberatively engaged in small-scale associative institutions dealing with the distributionary
politics of risk.
Risk-pool governance groups would thus be sites outside formal political structures in which
“public” deliberations would be taking place. In ideal form, these groups would create space for
political participation, debate and opinion formation within the economic sector and as part of
the system of risk managerialism. The deliberations of the group would require participants to
engage with the arguments, concerns, and beliefs of others in the same risk pool, thus creating
the potential for understandings that transcend self-interest.
The relatively small size of such groups, compared to the electorate, combined with the
particularity of the issues before them, might also create a venue in which the ideological stakes
249
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of health politics could de-escalate. Health-governance issues at the local level would be
problems that need to be solved, rather than opportunities to argue about grand philosophical
conflicts. 253 Indeed, they would necessitate decisions to be resolved in a manner for which
simple resort to abstract principles would simply not suffice. 254
The smallness of scale of the groups could be considered a drawback for the large-scale
project of remedying the democracy deficit in health care policy writ large. The kind of
engagement I envision might increase the deliberative quality of a health policy decision for a
localized risk pool, but would not necessarily produce debates about the more complex and
global questions concerning health care. It would not, for example, address the larger questions
of the proper role for market forces in determining care or the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of a single-payer system. Given that reality, risk- pool governance groups might
be thought of as better schools for democracy rather than as a useful mechanism for the
enhancement of national health policy.
But I believe that the potential of such local governance groups is more significant than that.
In the long run, localized engagement would almost certainly serve a broader educative function.
The smaller scale of risk pools will have no evasive effect on the tough questions of cost and
quality. Risk-pool governance groups will still need to confront head-on the tensions and tradeoffs in allocating resources for health care through the setting of terms for insurance coverage. 255
Ideally, broader policy preferences in such deliberative groups would emerge from an
accumulation of smaller decisions. In the process, the individuals directly involved in the groups
would become indigenous experts with regard to the risk pools. They would need to describe,
explain and justify their decisions to their peers, and in return, their peers would be responsible
for providing reaction and responses.
Similar sets of managerial issues might well arise for different risk groups. There would thus
be the potential for networks of locally based groups to affiliate and link up. One can envision
the beginnings of a functioning, informed democratic political community organized around
health care system governance issues.
Harnessing the economic power of risk pools to democratic governance structures could
thus have a powerful effect on the quality of American political culture as it engages with health
253
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policy issues. Providing mechanisms for citizens to have a greater level of participation in
shaping the parameters of their own health insurance could publicize the managerial discourse of
risk allocation. It would allow for this discourse to be reinterpreted in a public discussion as a set
of political, rather than predominately technical, questions. Such debates could only increase the
sophistication and the accessibility of the public policy discussion at the meta-level.
Finally, an important contribution of self-governance structures at the level of risk pools
would be to make it easier for citizens to infuse risk allocation discourse with moral values. As
Deborah Stone has argued, insurance is a technology of governance which invites contemplation
about issues of social responsibility because it requires resolution of questions about compassion
and collective responses to suffering. 256 In a world of individualism and competition, the very
presence of insurance “legitimates social obligation and mutual aid.” 257 More widespread citizen
engagement with such issues would, in effect, democratize the norm-setting implicit in the
process of health insurance risk allocation at the local level. 258
Democratic governance at the level of risk pools could thus change the valence of risk
discourse. Analysts often link a discourse of risk managerialism to economic models and marketbased initiatives that are focused on efficiency rather than on equity. 259 But a discourse of risk
could just as naturally be invoked to further strategies of inclusion and collective responsibility.
“Risk centered governance,” as Pat O’Malley has noted, comprises “a heterogeneous array of
practices with diverse effects and implications . . . not limited to a cadre of experts practicing the
dark arts.” 260 Risk-pool governance groups provide the potential of creating new democratic
points of intervention in this discursive system.
B. NEW WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE

To build a public, in the Habermasian sense of creating an ongoing structured conversation
based on knowledge and a respectful engagement with other citizens, requires a realistic
infrastructure. Workplaces are major repositories of the kind of social capital that could enable
meaningful participatory engagement by citizens in governance. 261 For that reason, I propose that
policy-makers consider the potential for workplace-based health insurance risk pools to be a
foundation for a new health policy public.
Many health policy experts argue for de-linking health insurance from the workplace. Their
argument is that the economic distortions from an employer sponsored insurance (ESI) system
outweigh any benefits that come from administrative convenience. 262 The most powerful
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argument against ESI is that it is doubly destructive: it fragments the overall population, thus
undercutting social insurance principles, and it subsidizes individual health care consumption,
thus creating moral hazard. 263 Political scientist Jacob Hacker convincingly argues that it is path
dependency, not logical reasoning, that has kept us locked into the workplace system for health
insurance. 264
I find these critiques of ESI to be compelling as rationales for a national, universal system of
health care delivery. Nevertheless, in this section, I offer a counterperspective: that progressives
should hesitate before abandoning the workplace as an organizational locus for political
participation in health system and risk allocation politics, even if financing mechanisms were
restructured to incorporate a richer mix of public funding. My argument is that infusing such risk
pools with worker governance can serve both instrumental and normative ends. 265
Workplace-based risk pools for health insurance contain aggregations of individuals who
share a common employer. Because membership in the plan is determined by reasons other than
the goal of securing insurance, and because the plan invariably includes persons in a broad range
of health status categories, ESI plans are “natural risk pools.” 266 The link to employment creates
a material reason for individuals to remain in rather than to exit the risk pool, which diminishes
the likelihood of high transaction costs for the insurer. All of these factors make ESI risk pools
attractive from an insurance perspective.
These same factors also make the ESI risk pool attractive as a site of governance for its
participants. The link to employment that creates a material reason for individuals not to exit the
risk pool also provides an incentive for employees to join a participatory governance process,
were one to be offered. Indeed, I share Michael Gottesman’s intuition that many employees
might welcome the opportunity to negotiate collectively with employers about health insurance
benefits and other collective goods, without committing to full-scale union representation on all
issues. 267
Most importantly, a workplace health insurance group maps precisely onto a set of rich,
dense, and strong social relationships. Using the work of Robert Putnam and other social
scientists, employment law scholar Cynthia Estlund has built a powerful argument that
democratic theory has underestimated the importance of workplaces in advancing democratic
ends.
263
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Three of Estlund’s assertions stand out as relevant to the project of workplace-based riskpool governance. First, people often build their civic skills in the workplace, through discussions
of political and other issues of public importance conducted in relatively public spaces. 268
Second, outside of family or close friends, social ties at the workplace provide people with a
stronger sense of belonging than any other institution in their lives. 269 Third, there is greater
racial diversity in the American workplace than in most other civic settings, including
neighborhoods and schools. 270
The network of social connections at work also provides useful prerequisites for effective
governance of health risk. The social connections in work settings can facilitate the development
of norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, which in turn reinforce patterns of cooperation. 271
This foundation of social capital can help to overcome problems of collective action, such as the
resistance to engaging with difficult allocation decisions (the tragic choices problem) or the
inclination to reject certain risks for oneself to achieve the gain that would result from someone
else assuming them (the prisoner’s dilemma problem). 272 Moreover, a normative advantage of
collectively made decisions about issues such as scope of coverage is that they are made by a
group operating behind a veil of ignorance as to what serious illnesses they or their families
might suffer. 273
Using workplace-based risk pools also locates the project in a familiar setting. For that
reason alone, it may be more realistic than proposals for entirely novel forms of participatory
governance such as “national issues conventions” 274 and “deliberation days.” 275
Employment-linked insurance groups thus offer a singularly hospitable social environment
for a democratic experimentalist project to take root. It would be neither plausible nor desirable
to require every employer-sponsored plan regardless of size to have a risk-pool governance
structure. But it seems realistic to imagine that policies might be put in place to enable risk-pool
governance structures in workplaces with a large enough number of employees to constitute a
robust risk pool and a meaningful degree of diversity. 276
Perhaps the bottom-line governance issue is how much power these new structures would
have and how much discretion and authority employers would retain. From an employer’s point
of view, a pre-negotiated overall budget would presumably be necessary before they would
268
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relinquish what is now unilateral control over specific issues of coverage and rationing. Worker
release time for those engaged in the governance process, causing some additional firm costs,
would be required. But external resources, such as private foundation or government funding,
might provide the other necessary support for such groups. If so, pilot studies of risk-pool
governance could be conducted on a budget-neutral basis for employers.
From the employee’s perspective, the most powerful normative objection to the
development of risk-pool governance mechanisms at the workplace is that it is naïve to imagine
that such institutions will function outside of the power relations around them. Given these
inequalities, the question is whether participants will be able to deliberate under conditions of
egalitarian reciprocity and respect. If the aspiration of deliberative democracy is to create
institutions which “tie[] the exercise of power to free reasoning among equals,” 277 the very
thickness of background social relations in a workplace may make it difficult to achieve that
result among coworkers.
Labor unions and workplace safety and health committees could serve as partial models for
workplace risk-governance mechanisms. 278 Indeed, the concept of a risk-governance structure in
essence duplicates, for non-unionized firms, one of the functions of unions. It thus speaks to the
strong support among workers for new ways to participate in workplace governance, 279 as well
as the priority that even unionized workers have given to protecting health insurance as a
benefit. 280
An ideal mechanism would facilitate cooperation while effectively deflecting both obvious
and subtle forms of manipulation and control, and ensuring representation of all worker
interests. 281 The current status, however, is closer to gridlock. Existing labor law restrictions on
employee representation by entities other than unions block experimentation, 282 and the historic
hostility of U.S. employers to employee organizations may make any degree of cooperation seem
utopian. 283
I do not underestimate the difficulty of these obstacles. Addressing them will necessarily
give rise to numerous complexities in a governance structure. Cooptation of workers by
employer interests, the possible capture of the process by those most motivated to further their
277
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self-interest, or the simple failure of group members to fairly represent other workers all come to
mind as possibilities. The history of gender and racial inequities within unions provides merely
one example of the fact that more democratic norms in workplace relations are hardly a panacea
for injustice.
Although a full discussion of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, ground rules
would be necessary to prevent risk-pool governance groups from exacerbating, rather that
moderating, inequities in health insurance. One protection would lie in limiting risk-pool
governance to the largest workplace groups, those with a significant degree of built-in diversity
of interests. Additionally, legal restrictions to require actuarial justification for limitations on
coverage would be necessary to counteract tendencies to exclude those with stigmatized
diseases, such as AIDS/HIV. 284
University of Michigan Medical School researchers have achieved hopeful results
suggesting that democratic structures would improve fairness and equity in access to health
insurance. They developed an intricate game model for constructing a group health benefits
package: “Choosing Healthplans All Together (CHAT).” 285 Using it in a series of simulations,
they found that participants were able to reach agreement on a series of trade-offs that they
accepted as legitimate. 286 In one version of the CHAT simulation, a group of insured persons
was asked to decide whether to allocate resources from their own insurance programs to cover
uninsured persons. All of the small groups and two-thirds of the individuals elected to do so for
uninsured children, and one-third of the individuals elected to redirect resources for both adults
and children who were uninsured. 287
The Michigan studies do not answer the question of what would happen in real life if health
insurance were made subject to more democratic decisionmaking, but new governance studies in
other contexts, such as urban public schools, can supply other guidelines. Deliberative
democracy scholars have developed procedures for coordinated oversight of local governance
projects through measurement, audits, and reviews, together with rules of participation that
constrain those holding greater social, economic, or political power from dominating group
dynamics. 288 These can provide at least a starting point for addressing some of the most
important concerns.
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These issues illustrate the ambitiousness and difficulty of using risk-pool governance
structures for enhancing democratic norms in health care policymaking. But such questions come
with the territory of experimentalist projects. My goal here is not to set forth a full blueprint of a
workplace-based risk-pool governance structure. Rather, it is to encourage the idea of embarking
on an experimentalist project through which these complexities can be explored.
C. SUMMARY: TOWARD JUSTICE

The proposal that I have outlined speaks to whether and how the concept, identity, and role
of citizen can become a viable component of health care system governance. But the proposal
also offers the potential for a new way to advance norms of distributional justice. The theoretical
constructs that have been deployed thus far to engage the justice and equity aspects of health
have fallen far short of success. Without claiming too much, I believe that greater attention to
inscribing democratic norms in the structures of health insurance governance would enhance a
discourse of interdependency that could, ultimately, result in greater equity.
Risk governance in health care instantiates a powerful compound of economic policy and
moral normativity. Its dimensions encompass both persons and conduct. 289 The practices of
allocating risk (whether through public or private mechanisms) identify certain risks to be
collective, others to be assumed by individuals; they mark certain actors as eligible for
protection, others as not; and they incentivize certain conduct, but not all conduct, as socially
beneficial because of its tendency to diminish certain forms of risk. Allocating the multiple
forms of financial risk in the health care system channels and structures choices about who will
receive what forms of care, who will pay for what kinds of illness, and how quality or negligence
will be defined.
But the normative assumptions and values underlying this system are often masked. The
empirical nature of actuarial understandings masks the power dynamics involved in these
decisions and makes them seem natural or inevitable, rather than political. 290 This masking
capacity is heightened in the health care arena, where natural forms of physiological risks are
intertwined with financial risk in the everyday functioning of health care delivery.
Managed care has normalized the idea that the health care system is organized around
interdependency and competition for limited resources. But popular understanding of the
dominance of risk governance in the system is still largely inchoate.
The equity decisions masked through risk governance have not been effectively engaged
through our traditional constructs for addressing justice issues. Liberal rights principles have
never proven adequate or even fully relevant as a basis for confronting the gaping health care
hole in the quality of American life. Negative liberty principles offer no purchase for contesting
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private actions, 291 and even equality mandates extending into the private sector seem off-kilter
for a problem that does not fit the minoritizing discourse of civil rights issues. 292 Moreover, the
individual fairness focus of a civil rights mandate can cut against an argument for community
sharing of risk. 293
The demographic picture of uninsured Americans also does not easily fit a civil rights
narrative. Uninsured Americans do not form a cohesive, identity-group style minority. Although
lack of insurance correlates with lower income, 294 the subgroups among the uninsured are
diverse: low-income workers and their children, self-employed entrepreneurs, and young adults
who perceive that their need for health insurance is minimal and not worth the expense. 295
Communitarian theories could offer more promise. 296 If we imagine ourselves as citizens in
a health republic, we are joined in a community of risk. The overwhelming justice issue is that
only some individuals are protected against unforeseeable adverse events. 297 However, many
communitarian theories tend to rely on assumptions of homogeneity within the group, which
give them limited usefulness in the health care context.298
Debates on the ethical dimensions of health care have thus tended to be dominated by the
conflict between norms associated with the insurance industry’s principle of “fair
discrimination” in allocating risk on one hand 299 and the solidarity norms of social insurance on
the other. 300 For those who wish to advance norms of equity in health care, while still
291
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acknowledging the risk structure that governs the health system, it has been difficult to find a
framework that engages both risk and equity in an effective manner.
I believe that addressing issues of equity within a risk-allocation paradigm is the best way to
capture and articulate the stakes at issue in the debate. It allows us (indeed, it forces us) to
articulate who gets included and excluded in the pooling process; how allocation decisions are
made; and whether there are systems of accountability and checks and balances built in to
produce a risk allocation system that is equitable, as well as efficient and flexible, in determining
how and to whom various kinds of risk are apportioned. Calling the system for what it is, and
how it actually operates, may turn out to be the most effective way to address the underlying
values issues.
Establishing a risk-centered normative frame will not, of course, resolve the tensions on its
own. Like the rhetorics of insurance advertising described by Tom Baker 301 and Deborah
Stone, 302 risk talk is highly elastic, capable of framing normative issues around invocations of
both solidarity and short-term self-interest. 303 It thus leaves the field open to the most successful
norm entrepreneurs in a health care debate that Americans have never fully resolved.
My proposal addresses the lack of a framework through which advocates for greater equity
can make their claims. It suggests a new institutional venue in which the inherent tensions and
trade-offs between equity and efficiency in health care might be negotiated in a more open and
democratic process.
This model of justice is frankly process-oriented. It is designed to function within, and
thereby to alter, any health care system that is centered on risk allocation, regardless of whether
such a system is structured around private or public institutions. The democracy gap exists both
in the status quo and in currently proposed reforms. Regardless of whether, or how, the financing
mechanisms change for our health care system, democratizing the policy inputs into that system
will remain important.
Whether greater democracy would lead to greater distributional justice is the central
question that we cannot answer without actual trial and error. It is at least possible that in a sector
as vast and complicated as the American health care system, a strategy that enables greater
fairness in a localized setting may be the most effective strategy for achieving fairness on a more
global scale. If individuals can successfully grapple with issues of equity in their own risk pools
and create fair outcomes, perhaps some of those lessons and successes might be replicated on the
national scale.
As an intellectual project, my proposal incorporates the egalitarian potential of insurance as
a governance technology within the realm of democratic theory. The veil of ignorance never
fully falls away from risk-pool decisionmaking. Even after a history of past claims has
accumulated, the constellation of future claims is always uncertain for individual participants.
For that reason, risk-pool governance unites within the health care system what Michael Dorf
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and Charles Sabel describe as the two core meanings of democracy: the deliberative function of
securing the good of all and the calculative function of achieving the good of each. 304
CONCLUSION
The era of actuarial medicine is not likely to end soon. The integrated system of financing
and service delivery established by managed care, designed and implemented to control costs,
has now changed the practice of medicine in ways that are likely to remain in place, regardless of
which particular efforts at reform are successful.
Mechanisms governing and distributing financial risk are what drive the health care system
today, employing an interlocking set of policies and mutually reciprocal practices evident in both
public and private sectors. All actors within the system—including not only insurers but also
providers and patients—assume aspects of financial risk, and the system’s viability is contingent
on risk allocation. Understanding how the legal system reinforces this risk-centered governance
provides a better explanation than do current health law paradigms of how the many strands of
doctrine within that body of law cohere and why its substantive importance matches its financial
heft.
Central to my project is the goal of framing risk-governance practices within political theory
and specifically as a problem for democracy. From that perspective, I argue that the doctrinal
complexities of ERISA preemption law can be read as a charter of corporate sovereignty in a
health risk-governance universe. To counter that dominance, I identify a new and important role
for health insurance risk pools as virtual jurisdictions with political and social meaning, rather
than merely actuarial units. In doing so, I argue that for something as central to our lives and our
economy as the health system, we should interrogate much more vigorously than we have so far
our conventional understanding of whether and how democratic norms and structures could
supply mediating processes for risk-centered decisionmaking.
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